Abstract: The Sino-Indian border self-defense counterattack in 1962 had a wide-ranging and far-reaching impact on India’s politics, military affairs, diplomacy, and psychology, which in turn profoundly affected the overall trend of Sino-Indian relations. India’s paranoia about territorial issues and its misunderstanding of the war have exacerbated the complexity of China-India border disputes, the protracted nature of problem resolution and the tortuous development of China-India relations. India’s increasing military role in its relations with China increases the risk of troubles or even serious conflicts in the border areas, and increases the uncertainty of China-India relations coming out of a trough. Historical experience shows that the Chinese side should have sufficient psychological preparation, strengthen research, make predictions, respond accurately, maintain focus, strive to cultivate, develop and utilize all positive forces, and work with all parties to bring China-India relations back to life as soon as possible. On track.
Key words: India’s 1962 war war cognitive border issue China policy
The Sino-Indian border self-defense counterattack war in 1962 had a huge impact on India, especially in its impression and perception of China and its policy decision-making towards China, which had an extremely extensive and far-reaching impact. Nehru said that the 1962 war “was a permanent education” for India, and although it did not change India’s basic policy, “it did change India’s China policy”. The fiasco on the battlefield has cast a heavy and continuous shadow on India, making it more difficult to resolve the Sino-Indian border issue, making the border dispute the most influential factor in the interaction of Sino-Indian relations. In the past 60 years, Sino-Indian relations have been slowly warming up, moving forward in twists and turns, with friendship and unfriendliness (even hostile exchanges) intertwined or alternated. After the Galwan standoff in 2020, China-India relations have fallen into a low ebb, which has an extremely important relationship with the perception of the 1962 war by all classes in India. So far, there have been many research achievements on the history of Sino-Indian relations in academic circles at home and abroad, but most of them have been interpreted in the form of special topics or chronological history, from the framework of the history of the Cold War or the perspective of international relations and diplomatic history. The long period from 1949 to 2021 There are few works summarizing and analyzing the long-term impact of the 1962 war on India’s China policy. Based on relatively detailed archival documents, this paper sorts out and analyzes the impact of the war on India’s perception of China and the direction of its policy toward China from three aspects: boundary issues, nationalism, and military affairs. It is helpful for people to have an objective and rational understanding of the current China-India relations and their future prospects.
1. The rigid border issue position that is constantly solidified and blessed
The territorial complex of Indian leaders such as Nehru can be said to be deeply rooted in the bone marrow, from not giving up an inch of land on the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan, not negotiating with Portugal, and disregarding the pressure of the United States and other Western countries to send heavy troops to retake the Portuguese enclave Goa in one fell swoop It can be seen in events such as step-by-step tightening of control and even the annexation of the Kingdom of Sikkim. India’s one-sided and stubborn stance on the Sino-Indian border issue led to many conflicts and even wars in the Sino-Indian border area from 1959 to 1962, which further highlighted India’s rigid stance on the border issue. More importantly, after India’s defeat in the 1962 war, it failed to objectively and correctly summarize and reflect on it. Instead, it strengthened the extremely unhealthy and even harmful misunderstanding of the border issue, which has been solidified and blessed. Such rhetoric and behavior, which disregard historical facts and only proceed from one’s own emotions and wishes, without considering each other’s position and rights and interests, have had a significant negative impact on the development of China-India relations.
India’s long-standing stubborn stance on the border issue is mainly related to its perception of the causes of border disputes. It puts the cause and responsibility for the outbreak of border armed conflicts between China and India in the late 1950s and the 1962 war entirely on China. The important document “History of Conflict with China in 1962”, which has not been declassified so far by the Indian side, stated that India-China relations began to show discord in the late 1950s, mainly due to China’s construction of the Xinzang Highway in the late 1950s. In 1957, China occupied the Aksai Chin Plateau without authorization.” The statement of the spokesperson of the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on November 27, 1962 also stated that China “invaded the territory of India in 1957, and made a claim to a large area of India two years later, which created the border issue. Before that, there was no border issue with India. Political elites in China even took China’s liberation of Tibet in 1950-1951 as the starting point of the Sino-Indian dispute, arguing that the 1962 war was fundamentally “derived from China’s expansionism and occupation of Tibet. “On April 24, 1961, the Lok Sabha passed a resolution, making it clear that India’s “territorial integrity” (that is, India’s claimed borders) is unquestionable and ensuring that the content of the Act will not be amended within three years. In his reply letter to Premier Zhou Enlai on March 1, he told himself that when Britain withdrew from the South Asian subcontinent in 1947, India’s “naturally existing border” had become India’s border. For a long time, India’s biggest complaint against China is that, It reluctantly passed a treaty in 1954 that “acquiesced to the Chinese occupation of Tibet without getting any compensation on the border”. After China launched a self-defense counterattack against India on October 20, 1962, Nehru In a radio speech to the country on the 22nd, he accused China of “repaying virtue with resentment”; in a letter to British Prime Minister MacMillan on the same day, he said that India had no choice but to resist China’s self-defense counterattack; Letter to the British Prime Minister, accusing the People’s Liberation Army of entering the eastern sector of the border that China has “recognized for 12 years”, and India “will not surrender to aggression no matter the outcome”, nor will it agree with China “occupying Indian territory and using it as a bargaining chip to force India Resolve border differences in accordance with China’s wishes.”
It is incomprehensible that India thinks that China’s self-defense counterattack is out of jealousy of it. On October 22, 1962, Nehru told the British High Commissioner to India that China believed three or four years ago that India was attached to an imperialist country and was not worthy of being friends with India. China was very jealous of India’s industrial and economic development. He also complained about China’s wishful thinking about the demarcation of the border, saying China had said it did not recognize the “McMahon Line” but would not cross it. The Indian government has publicly stated on multiple occasions that China’s violation of Indian territory across the McMahon Line will not be tolerated.
Based on the above absurd understanding, the Indian government ignored China’s explanation of the historical reasons for the border dispute and its principled position on the border issue. The same is true when faced with adverse situations later. Regarding the three proposals put forward by China on October 24, 1962 to stop the border conflict, resume peace negotiations, and resolve the border issue peacefully, the Indian government believes that “it has no meaning or meaning” and “is a hoax that cannot fool anyone”, The one-sided request of the parties to withdraw to the Line of Control of 8 September 1962 was reiterated in the note. On November 4, Premier Zhou Enlai, in the spirit of restoring the friendly relations between the two countries before 1959, once again called on Nehru to actively respond to the three proposals of the Chinese government. On the 6th, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a serious warning on the continuous shelling of Chinese border guards by the Indian army in the western sector of the Sino-Indian border. After China won the second stage of the self-defense counterattack operation and announced a ceasefire and withdrawal on November 21, 1962, it repeatedly called on India to hold negotiations, but the Indian side either made its own unreasonable demands or refused to respond. On December 8, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense issued a statement on the voluntary withdrawal of our border troops from the east and west sections of the Sino-Indian border, which fully demonstrated the most sincere efforts of the Chinese government to resolve the border issue peacefully. It is hoped that the Indian government will also make corresponding efforts quickly. For quite a long time after the war, Indian officials kept a high profile refusal to negotiate with China on the border issue, and did not resume negotiations until nearly 20 years later (1981).
Not only did India refuse to hold negotiations on the border issue with China, but it also groundlessly criticized and even accused China and Pakistan of holding friendly talks on the border issue. In 1961, China and Pakistan began to maintain contact on the delimitation of the border between Xinjiang and Pakistan-controlled Kashmir; in May 1962, they agreed to hold negotiations on the “positioning and delimitation” of the border in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. After several rounds of talks, the two sides signed an agreement on March 2, 1963, delineating the border between Pakistan-administered Kashmir and China. India considers Pakistan-controlled Kashmir to be “illegally occupied Indian territory” and has declared the China-Pakistan agreement invalid. Some Indian newspapers described it as “an agreement between two thieves”. In April 1965, India protested against the signing of a border protocol between China and Pakistan. Not only that, in August 1982, India also unreasonably criticized the Khunjerab Pass, which opened the border between China and Pakistan.
For more than 50 years, India has not only accused and even slandered and smeared China on the border issue many times, but has also continuously created frictions and incidents, making the border issue the biggest factor hindering the normal development of China-India relations.
In October and November 1962, Nehru publicly rejected the Chinese government’s proposal to hold peace talks on many occasions, saying that he would fight China to the end. After China took the initiative to announce a ceasefire and withdraw its troops, Nehru also declared three times on November 22, 23 and 27 that he would “long-term war” with China. After that, in his six speeches on March 1, 2, 3, 9, 13, and 20, 1963, he declared that there would be no compromise with China. After Nehru’s death on May 26, 1964, Shastri had just succeeded as prime minister. He reiterated his refusal to negotiate with China on June 11, and then published it 17 times from November 15 to December 1. speech, calling China an enemy of India. On March 1, 1966, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi slandered China as a threat to the border. On June 13, 1967, Foreign Minister Chagra actually called an area of 70 to 72 square miles at the junction of China, India and Myanmar as “Indian territory”. On June 22, 1970, the Indian government slandered China for “invading” Bhutan three times in May, and lodged a “protest” with China. On December 16, 1971, India launched a large-scale war of aggression against Pakistan, which was condemned by the Chinese government. Subsequently, the Indian Parliament passed the “Northeast Region (Reorganization) Act” on the 21st, and the south of the “McMahon Line” was “Northeast Border”. The 90,000-square-kilometer Chinese territory of the Special Economic Zone was renamed “Arunachal Pradesh” and classified as a “Central Territory”. On August 7, 1972, Defense Minister Jagjivan Ram said that India would make a claim to the land that Pakistan “ceded” to China in the “occupied area” of Kashmir. In September 1974, the Indian Parliament passed a constitutional amendment to annex the Kingdom of Sikkim. In April 1975, the Indian government officially turned Sikkim into one of its states. In April 1979, Prime Minister Desai stated that “the territory occupied by China will be recovered”, and in June he said that until the border and other issues are resolved, India cannot achieve full normalization of relations with China. In February 1980, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi falsely claimed that “China has occupied large tracts of land in India, Bhutan, Nepal and Burma”. In September 1981, Foreign Minister Rao said that China had “occupied” about 14,500 square miles of Indian territory in the Ladakh region. In August 1984, the Indian media spread rumors that three companies of Chinese troops had entered the Hunza area. In July 1986, India lodged a protest with China over the so-called “invasion” of Indian territory in the Sandoro Valley by Chinese border guards in the eastern section of the Sino-Indian border. In February 1987, India announced the official establishment of “Arunachal Pradesh”, which the Chinese government would never recognize. In April 2009, Indian President Patil first visited the Tawang region in southern Tibet (called “Arunachal Pradesh” in India) for the first time. When inspecting the border troops, she said that she still remembered the “Battle of Varong” in 1962. . In October 2019, the Indian government officially implemented the “Jammu-Kashmir Reorganization Act” to establish the “Jammu-Kashmir Union Territory” and “Ladakh Union Territory”, exposing its greater ambitions in border and disputed areas .
2. Unhealthy mentality and nationalist propaganda
After the war in 1962, the mentality of the Indians changed from blind self-confidence to inferiority complex and resentment towards China, and Sino-Indian relations dropped to a freezing point. Indian elites from all walks of life failed to deeply reflect on and correctly summarize the reasons for their failures. Instead, they used the military defeat to incite and manipulate anti-China sentiment and nationalism. It can quickly return to the right track, but has gone through a process of cold, slow heating, gradually warming, returning to normal, and a few degrees of backwardness after normal, generally showing a spiral and wave-like slow forward trend.
The Indian people are unaware of the causes of the Sino-Indian border dispute and the deterioration of Sino-Indian relations, which makes nationalism easy to manipulate and incite. In order to promote domestic unity and expand the political foundation, political elites such as Indian leaders who have been hit hard by the war have used nationalism to incite and use nationalism (but are often coerced and kidnapped by nationalism). The border issue in India has become a “political correctness” that no one dares to question. It should be pointed out that the Indian official and mainstream media never explain or reveal the historical background and truth of the Sino-Indian border differences to the public. Even the US official said that in the more than ten years since the founding of the People’s Republic of China and the suppression of the rebellion in Tibet, “India has dealt with China as smoothly as possible and tested China’s intentions, but has not disclosed the seriousness of the border issue to the Indian people.” After the rebellion in Tibet, the flight of the Dalai Lama, and the bloody conflict between China and India in Langju in August 1959, Indian officials began to make the border issue public, but they ignored the facts and made only one-sided statements. From June to August 1959, the Indian government published the booklet “The Truth About Tibet”, distorting the facts and accusing China without grounds; The Hindustan Times, The Statesman, and the Times of India have accused China of “aggressing” Indian territory, calling for resolutely defending the Indian border and never tolerate the invasion of Indian territory. China’s self-defense counterattack against India has been described by India as “China’s perfidy” or betrayal. Ordinary Indians believed that until October 20, 1962, “the Chinese were still regarded by India as partners and friends in Asia” and that the continuous advance of the Chinese army “broken the 5,000-year peace between China and India” and thereafter “in the In the eyes of the Indians, the Chinese have become an ungrateful and perfidious nation.” The war was described by the then Indian President Radhakrishnan as a “seeking justice” (Dharma) war.
The Indian Parliament is blindly tough on China, which has contributed to the deterioration of Sino-Indian relations most of the time. The Parliament accused China of “ignoring the friendly actions of the Indian side and encroaching on the territory of India”, and in a resolution passed unanimously on November 14, 1962 stated: “This Parliament supports the Indian people’s efforts to drive the aggressors out of the sacred Indian territory. Resolutely determined, no matter how hard the struggle is and how long it lasts.” Since then, whenever tensions arise in Sino-Indian relations, the parliament has, without exception, held a tough stance on China, and had a very negative reaction to the Indian government’s decision on China. Influence.
The Indian media played a very negative role in the impact of the war. The Indian media has little knowledge of military affairs, and even described the tactical shift of the 1962 war as a retreat, which intensified the public’s panic and hostility to China, and the “overall impact was devastating.” So far, the Indian media has rarely objectively reported on the historical origins of the 1962 war, the main reasons for its evolution, the role of individual decision-makers, international repercussions, and the impact on India’s international status. effect.
As the most important decision-maker, the Indian government has been under tremendous pressure from the parliament, the media and the public during the process of deteriorating Sino-Indian relations to the outbreak of a border war, making it difficult to make a correct decision in a timely manner. Even the Indian military complained: “The ignorant and noisy media and opposition parties played an extremely irresponsible role in forcing Nehru to reluctantly take the road of military confrontation.”
While feeling humiliated by the fiasco in 1962, Indian leaders and political elites also summed up two major “windfalls”: one is the educational significance of the defeat to Indians; His own efforts for many years have failed to promote national unity and enhance the spirit of patriotism. At the beginning of November 1962, the defeat of the Indian army on the battlefield had been determined, and the war had not yet ended. Indira Gandhi, daughter of Nehru and a rising star of Congress Party politics, said: “We have been working very hard and diligently to integrate this country. Now the Chinese have done this for us.” Nehru said: “The terrible shock caused by China’s invasion has brought a rebirth of the spirit of India.” In order to encourage the Chinese people, Indian leaders frequently made sensational speeches. On December 7, 1962, Nehru claimed at a press conference, “If the Chinese do not withdraw from Indian territory, India will have to expel the Chinese invaders.” On the 23rd, President Ladakh Rishnan said India “must regain its lost prestige”. In order to maintain the hard-won domestic unity, the Indian government stubbornly adheres to a tough stance and has repeatedly rejected the Chinese government’s proposal for peace negotiations. The Ta Kung Pao editorial of May 25, 1963 said, “India’s decision not to negotiate with China is to maintain border tensions”. Elites from all walks of life have rarely used the anti-China atmosphere brought about by the defeat to incite nationalism, which has had a very harmful impact on the formation and development of India’s China policy. Its main practices are as follows:
One is to minimize the impact of the war on the people. Nehru and the military deliberately underreported and concealed the number of casualties of the Indian army out of fear of damage to the morale of the people. Regarding China’s initiative to repatriate prisoners of war to India and return cars, cannons, guns and other weapons and equipment, the Indian side actually claimed that China was trying to “gain the support of public opinion”, and said that the preferential treatment of prisoners of war was brainwashing, “this is really a disservice to India. An insult to the army”.
The second is to fabricate “heroes” and “heroic deeds” and engage in populist patriotic education. On October 22, 1962, Defense Secretary Menon said “this attack is a test for the Indians”. After the defeat, the Indian government and media created “heroes” and fabricated “heroic deeds” in order to reduce the negative impact, boost morale, and promote and maintain unity. For example, the Indian Army Major Shaiteng Singh, who died in battle (“8 bullets in the body”) at the Rezanla Pass in Ladakh, was buried in a high-standard ceremony, and awarded him the title of “Indian Warrior”, the highest award for bravery in India, and also The village of Bensal in his hometown, Jodepur County, is named after him. The Indian media continuously reported on the “moving deeds” of the front-line soldiers, and the Statesman newspaper published a number of front-line stories, saying that the Indian soldiers showed “heroism and indomitable spirit” in the battle, boasting that the Indian army had “carried out a” in Wanong. Epic Battle”, “Breaking the Myth of Chinese Invincibility”.
The third is to incite populist patriotic education. India has tried its best to smear and vilify China at home. In order to instill populist patriotism in the students, the Indian Information Bureau released a broadcast titled “You and National Defense”, saying that the most urgent thing at the moment is that “teachers should make students aware of the impact of the conflict between China and India on their future.” . The Indian media extensively reported on the patriotism of the people. The Ministry of Finance announced the establishment of a national defense fund that can donate money, materials, and “voluntary labor”. According to the official Indian military history, “the humiliation suffered militarily has left deep wounds in the hearts of the Indian nationals”, but it also inspired “tragic” feelings across the country, “a kind of battle to drive out the last Chinese “determination” became the dominant sentiment in the country; “as if all internal disputes and struggles ceased in an instant”, the whole country had only one desire: “fight to the end”.
Fourth, cheer yourself up. After India’s defeat in the war, she was emboldened to cheer herself up. The news bureau broadcast from December 26-29, 1962 stated that China “is facing increasing isolation in the communist world” and is also “unprecedentedly isolated” internationally; India also wants peace, but “cannot”. According to China’s conditions”, “the former territory must be restored, and the sovereignty of the occupied areas must be maintained.” After the 1962 war, India took a tougher stance on the border issue, and the following mandarin became a typical rhetoric: India “always hopes to maintain friendly and peaceful relations with China”, but China is “hostile to India and hypocritically covers up this behavior”, A dignified and freedom-loving India will not yield to aggression, “nor will it agree to China’s occupation of Indian territory and use it as a bargaining chip to force India to resolve border differences according to China’s wishes.”
Fifth, being tough on China has become “politically correct”. Indian leaders and political elites used the “humiliation” brought about by the defeat to create grief at home, cultivate “determination” for revenge, and condone and support nationalist sentiments. Not only that, since then, many political leaders have often created border tensions to maintain and increase their support at home and seek their own and their own party’s self-interest. Being tough on China on the border issue has become “politically correct” in India. Soon after the war, the Indian government withdrew its consulate staff in Lhasa and Shanghai and closed Chinese offices in Kolkata and Mumbai, cutting all ties with China after a series of decisions. In addition, the Indian government has extremely inhumanely ordered a military camp in Dalali, Maharashtra, to centrally detain all Chinese citizens living in the border areas of Assam and West Bengal. After the war in 1962, whenever India used the border issue or the Tibet issue to create tensions in Sino-Indian relations, its ruling party or opposition party, or different factions within the party, had almost a high degree of unanimity in its tough stance on China, and even tried to rely on any means by any means. Blame opponents for not being tough enough on China for political gain.
3. The Influence of Increasing Military Factors
After the 1962 war, the military factor played an ever-increasing role in India’s relations with China. In the official summary and reflection on the reasons for the defeat in 1962 by the Indian government, in addition to the misjudgment of the situation, the lack of preparation, the backward infrastructure in the border areas, and the serious bureaucracy, the most detailed and deeply reflected number of military. Affected by this, India’s emphasis on the military sector has been increasing, and the military has played an increasingly important role in its China policy, and has even become an important weight for government leaders to gain momentum in diplomatic activities.
Two of India’s most important official secret documents, the Brooks Report and the History of the 1962 Conflict with China, both agree that the main reason for India’s defeat in 1962 was insufficient military preparation. The military acknowledged that the 1962 war was a military fiasco, but did not consider it a failure of the Indian Army, on the grounds that the forces involved in it only accounted for about 20% of the Indian Army, and most of the Army’s elite troops stationed in Punjab and Kashmir were not Not in combat; neither did the navy and air force, with the exception of air supplies and air transport forces. Through this war, Indian officials said that they have “learned a lesson”, and they are more aware of the importance of strength represented by the military – in the face of the ruthlessness of geopolitics and “real politics”, a country’s strength is its security. ultimate guarantee.
Indians believe that they have been the target of aggression for thousands of years. In the minds of Indians, the reasons for these misfortunes lie in military weakness and political disunity. Shortly after the war began, the President of India issued a state of emergency on October 26 under constitutional authority. Since then, the National Defense Law has been passed by the parliament, the people have been mobilized, and a defense fund has been established. This fundamental shift in attitudes among Indians is “probably the most enduring consequence of the conflict of 1962.” In April 1963, the main contents of the national defense plan outlined by the new Secretary of Defense Chavan in Parliament include: the army must be expanded; the air force must be expanded and equipped with modern weapons; a strong production base must be established; such auxiliary facilities. The goal is to turn the military into a formidable war machine within the next few years. To do this, the size of the Army will be doubled (to nearly 800,000 people). The modernization of the existing army and the expansion of the army are carried out at the same time. It is necessary to solve the main problems such as shortage of foreign exchange and limited industrial production capacity, and strive to increase the assistance of the United States and the United Kingdom to build 10 new mountain divisions. military training institutions, attach importance to strengthening the construction of production bases, military factories to produce day and night, and so on. In addition, the “retreat”, “the bane of the failure of the military operation in 1962”, was deleted from the content of Indian military teaching, and it was repeatedly instilled in the students that no matter if they were cut off or surrounded, the troops must hold their positions and never retreat.
In order to improve and maintain its military strength as soon as possible, India pays more attention to and relies on external assistance. When Nehru was in power, India became more and more dependent on foreign aid. The proportion of foreign aid in India’s total expenditure jumped from 9.6% in the “First Five-Year Plan” (1951-1956) to 20.6% in the “Second Five-Year Plan” (1956-1961) and the “Third Five-Year Plan” (1961-1966) year) 30%. The main sources of foreign arms aid are not only Western countries such as the United States, Britain, France and the Federal Republic of Germany, but also allies of Western countries such as Turkey. During the 1962 war, a squadron of US Air Force C-130 Hercules transport aircraft played an important role in supporting India’s military operations. On November 15, 1962, India asked Britain and the United States to provide weapons such as aircraft bombs; on the 17th, India handed over the list of required Air Force fighters to the United States (about 1 billion US dollars); on the 19th, Nehru said that 12 squadrons of jets were needed. fighter jets and foreign pilots; on the 20th, India asked the United States to provide urgent large-scale assistance to build a modern air force; on December 7th, Nehru said that the United States could send advisers to India (but not ground troops). One of the main reasons for India’s refusal to respond after China announced its voluntary ceasefire and withdrawal of troops and called on India to negotiate with China was that “India’s American friends and British friends will be disappointed in India if they finally seek to reach some kind of agreement with China.” , thereby reducing the likelihood that India will receive a much-needed surge in aid. In order to show the air protection of Western countries to India, in November 1963, Indian Lieutenant General Arjain Singh, as the general leader, led a joint air force exercise code-named “Training” between India and the British and American Air Forces, which was held by India The military called it “the culmination of military cooperation between India and the Western world”.
The Soviet Union also continued to increase aid to India. Soon after the war, the Soviet Union changed its ostensibly neutral stance and, despite China’s opposition, agreed to continue the “MiG deal” with India: build a factory in India to produce MiG-21 supersonic fighter jets; Signed an agreement to help build a steel plant; An-12 transport aircraft and Mi-4 helicopters were also delivered ahead of schedule; agreed to sell helicopters and transport aircraft to India in rubles on deferred payments. The Soviet Union’s military aid to India was so great that Nehru said that “the Indian-Soviet friendship is worth 20 divisions.” Since then, the Soviet Union’s military assistance to India has continued, and until today, two-thirds of India’s total arms purchases still come from Russia.
The military increasingly presents a duality in India’s relations with China: exploited and exploited. In December 1968, Indira Gandhi said that India must become stronger in order to “improve” its relations with China. This should be the unanimous voice of the Indian elites. In 1998, in order to conduct a nuclear test, India justified that China posed a “nuclear threat” to it. In recent years, with the sharp deterioration of Sino-US relations, India’s relations with China have seriously regressed. In addition to occasional military frictions, confrontations and even conflicts in land border areas, India has also frequently caused troubles at sea. For example, sending warships into the South China Sea to “sense of presence”, strengthening military cooperation with Western countries such as the United States, Japan, and Australia, participating in or inviting these countries to participate in Indian-led maritime military exercises, and greatly strengthening the Andaman Sea and Nickelbar Islands military deployment and infrastructure to “effectively counter China’s expansion in the Indian Ocean region.”
4. China-India relations that have been moving forward with twists and turns
From the above-mentioned India’s stubborn stance on the border issue, the use of the 1962 defeat to instigate and fostered nationalism and the continuous improvement of its military role, we can clearly sort out the slow development of Sino-Indian relations after the war, The general direction of the twists and turns.
First, the border issue has been seriously restricting the development of bilateral relations. Due to India’s paranoid and arrogant behavior on the border issue, China and India have held various channels and various forms of protracted talks and negotiations on the border issue for more than 40 years, but neither has achieved substantial results.
In February 1979, the Chinese side proposed a package of solutions to the Sino-Indian boundary issue. In December 1981, China and India held their first border negotiations in Beijing. Nearly 20 years after the Sino-Indian border war broke out, the two sides finally resumed border negotiations. From then to November 1987, the two countries held eight rounds of official talks to seek ways to resolve the border issue and improve relations between the two countries, but no substantive progress was made. From June 1989 to November 2002, the Communist Party of China and India held 13 rounds of border joint working group talks and deputy foreign minister-level consultations, most of which yielded no results, and only 4 rounds of progress were made. Each round lasts for 2 to 3 days, and the last round ends after only 1 day.
During the Sino-Indian Joint Working Group Meeting on the Boundary Issue and the Deputy Foreign Minister-level Consultation, a Sino-Indian Diplomatic and Military Expert Group Meeting was held in February 1994. Each meeting lasted 2 to 3 days. By March 2005, a total of 15 times. Except for some progress on individual specific details, the two sides barely touched on the substantive issue of borders. The sixth meeting in June 1998 only dealt with the issue of India’s nuclear test.
On the condition that the Sino-Indian joint working group talks and deputy foreign minister-level consultations have not been continued, and the Sino-Indian border issue diplomatic and military expert group meeting is still being held, the first Sino-Indian border issue special representatives’ meeting was held in October 2003. Till December 2019, it has been held 22 times. Each session lasts for 1 to 5 days, and the two sides reach some consensus on guiding principles, negotiation framework, working mechanism, etc., but the border issue itself has still not made substantial progress. After 15 meetings of the Special Representatives on the China-India Boundary Issue, the China-India Border Affairs Consultation and Coordination Working Mechanism meeting was held in March 2012, and a total of 22 meetings were held by June 2021, none of which was substantive. Sexual progress announced.
In addition to the above-mentioned five-level meetings and meetings, the two sides also held several China-India border expert-level meetings, China-India department-level security dialogues, meetings between officials of the Chinese and Indian foreign ministries, and informal dialogues between the special representatives of the China-India border issue.
So far, India has been asking or expecting China to agree or acquiesce to its position on the border issue, and its attitude on the border “line” is very tough. Whether it is the “habitual line” or the “actual control line”, successive Indian governments over the past 70 years have always adhered to their inherent positions, and there is little flexibility and little room for maneuver in negotiations at all levels between the two sides. There is no looseness. In the early 1970s, Sino-Indian relations began to ease. Especially after the normalization of relations in the late 1980s, India’s declared position on the border issue seems to be no longer so “persistent”, but a little closer will find that it is only superficial. The attitude has changed slightly: the previous attitude of refusing to negotiate on the border issue has been changed, and we have agreed to hold talks on the border issue, and generally agreed to work with me to maintain peace and security in the border area.
Second, rising nationalism determines the slow and tortuous progress of China-India relations. India’s extremely unfriendly attitude and policy towards China after the 1962 war led and drove the development of China-India relations through a long, slow, tortuous and difficult process.
After the war in 1962, the Sino-Indian relationship turned cold in an all-round way. It only started to warm up a few years later, and it warmed up significantly in the mid-1980s. On December 4, 1962, the Indian government issued an order prohibiting all Chinese aircraft and people who were Chinese citizens from flying over India. On the 27th, the Indian government arbitrarily ordered the Bank of Bombay to transfer all the deposits of the Bank of China General Management Office to the Kolkata High Court. On January 26, 1963 (Republic Day of India), Nehru announced the establishment of the “National Rural Volunteer Team” to prepare for the possible recurrence of the Sino-Indian border war. On March 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, 13th and 20th, Nehru declared in six speeches that there would be no compromise with China and was ready to fight for a long time. After Nehru’s death, the new Prime Minister Shastri made consecutive unfriendly speeches. On October 16, 1964, he said that China’s first nuclear explosion that day was a threat to peace, and on the 30th, he said that India would never China surrendered. Indira Gandhi slandered China on March 1, 1966 for “creating tension in the world and pursuing a policy that is not conducive to peace”. On September 16, 1968, the Indian government instructed its officials not to accept or ignore any invitations from Chinese embassies in various countries. On June 17, 1970, Indira Gandhi stated that India “will not change” its position on China at present, and on September 8, he claimed to use all his energy to “defend” China and Pakistan. The Indian government also used the Dalai Lama and the “Tibet issue” to put pressure on China. On November 27, 1968, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi “meeted” the Dalai Lama in New Delhi. On October 10, 1969, President Giri and Foreign Minister Singh “meeted” the Dalai Lama respectively. 1970年3月24日，印度在联合国人权委员会上提出“西藏问题”，对中国内政横加干涉。 1977年8月初，印度政府领导人又公然“接见”达赖。 1979年6月20日，印度领导人第一次把边界问题与整个中印关系挂钩。总理德赛表示，在边界问题解决之前，同中国实现全面关系正常化是不可能的。
然而，在上述不友好甚至意在恶化中印关系的言行中，也不乏关系开始缓缓升温的迹象。印度政府虽然在1962年12月颁令禁止中国飞机飞经印度上空，但尼赫鲁还是特令允准周恩来总理一行的专机在1963年12月出访非洲途中飞经印度领空。英迪拉?甘地多次发表显示温度的言论。她在1966年2月16日表示，如条件允许，准备同中国或其他任何人会谈；1969年1月1日说应当设法寻求解决中印争端的途径；9月12日称准备同中国进行“有意义的会谈”，以便解决中印争端；1970年3月13日称“希望改善”对华关系，也希望印巴友好；1973年6月2日进一步表示印度希望同中国建立正常关系。此外，总统吉里和外长辛格在1973年2月19日也发表了“愿意促使”和“希望”同中国关系正常化的言论。1974年5月10日，辛格在联邦院重申西藏是中国的一部分，印度政府重申愿意派特使到北京商谈两国关系问题。
除了上述外交和政治层面的表态外，中印还利用“致电”使关系保温和升温。双方通过向对方领导人去世表示哀悼保持温度。1964年5月27日，周恩来总理对尼赫鲁总理逝世表示哀悼；1976年1月9日，总理英迪拉?甘地对周恩来总理逝世深表哀悼，15日还和外长查万前往中国驻印度大使馆吊唁；7月12日和9月9日，总统法赫鲁丁?阿里?艾哈迈德对朱德委员长和毛泽东主席逝世表示哀悼；英迪拉?甘地除对毛泽东主席逝世表示诚挚哀悼外，还和查万前往中国驻印度大使馆吊唁；1977年2月13日，华国锋总理对艾哈迈德总统逝世深表哀悼，乌兰夫副委员长15日前往印度驻华使馆吊唁；1981年5月31日，英迪拉?甘地对宋庆龄名誉主席逝世表示诚挚哀悼，并于6月2日到中国驻印度大使馆吊唁；1984年10月31日，中国国家主席和总理联名致电，对英迪拉?甘地不幸遇刺逝世深表哀悼，姚依林副总理作为中国政府特使于11月2日赴新德里参加葬礼；1986年10月29日，印度副总统文卡塔拉曼发唁电悼念叶剑英同志逝世。
中印两国领导人还通过贺电助关系升温。1964年6月至1985年1月，中印每当对方新的国家元首和政府首脑就任时，都致电祝贺。更能体现关系升温的标志是印度祝贺新中国国庆时间节点的变化。1970年10月3日，英迪拉?甘地致电周恩来总理，祝贺新中国国庆21周年，为1962年战争后印度第一次祝贺新中国国庆。1971年1月26日，印度驻华使馆在1962年后首次举行印度国庆招待会。需要注意的是，英迪拉?甘地总理虽在1971—1975年间每年都祝贺新中国国庆，但致电时间大都是中国国庆节当天或之后，显然是有温度、缺热度。然而，在1984年和1986年的中国国庆节，印度总统和总理都在9月30日致电祝贺，发贺电时间由滞后变为提前，体现了印度对华态度的一个明显变化。
从20世纪60年代中期到80年代中期，印度对华态度之所以升温缓慢，除多种国内外因素之外，印度不愿平等对待中国的大国架子等不健康心态也起了十分重要的作用。印度政府领导人虽然言辞好听，但矜持的心理及有条件改善中印关系的小心思不言自明。例如，1969年11月12日，印度外交秘书对中国临时代办表示，如中国先派大使赴印，印度即可派大使到中国就任。1974年6月15日，英迪拉?甘地称印度“愿在平等基础上改善对华关系”，但中国却“有许多挑衅行为”，双方的友谊“取决于中国怎样看印度”。此外，印度鉴于当时的中印苏关系，试图拿苏联暗自施压中国。1973年11月23日，印度外长辛格称，同中国实现关系正常化不会以损害印苏友好关系为代价。1980年12月8日，英迪拉?甘地表示，印中改善关系不会牺牲苏联的利益。
20世纪70年代中期开始，随着中美关系的解冻、缓和与正常发展，地区关系和国际关系发生重大变化。印度为维护自身利益，明显改善对华态度，中印关系稳步回暖。1976年7月和9月，印度驻华大使纳拉亚南和中国驻印大使陈肇源先后抵达北京和新德里赴任。1979年2月，印度外长瓦杰帕伊访问中国。1980年1月，黄华外长出席印度驻华使馆举行的国庆宴会。4月19日，英迪拉?甘地表示印中悬而未决的问题不应妨碍两国改善关系，5月25日又说印度准备不带先决条件同中国商讨关系正常化问题（没有把边界问题与中印关系挂钩）。1981年5月6日，英迪拉?甘地说印中两国关系将来只会得到改善。6月下旬，中国国务院副总理兼外长黄华正式访印，这是I960年以来第一位中国政府领导人访问印度。1982年3月23日，印度外交部发表中印关系报告，表示希望两国举行会谈从而使关系正常化。10月22日，印度外交国务部长拉希姆在联邦院表示希望同中国改善关系。1985年1月15日，总理拉吉夫?甘地表示印中会谈取得一定进展。17日，总统宰尔?辛格说印中关系已出现改善迹象，“应该继续努力，寻求解决边界问题的办法”，显示出一种新的积极姿态。6月6日，拉吉夫?甘地访问埃及时在开罗发表讲话，希望改善印中关系，10月27日又表示印中关系“一定能得到改善”。
20世纪80年代上半期，随着政治、外交关系的良性互动，中印文化、旅游、环境、体育、经贸、工会等多领域的交流也逐渐升温，出现了多个“第一”。1981年8月，泰戈尔学术讨论会在北京开幕，成为我国首次就一位东方作家召开的全国性学术会议。1988年5月，中印第一个文化合作协定在北京签署。1981年9月9日至10月4日，18名印度香客到西藏冈底斯山和玛法木错湖朝圣，成为1962年以来第一批到中国该地区朝圣的印度香客。9月，印度环境保护代表团访华，成为印度派往国外的第一个环境保护代表团。11月，印度少年网球队成为近20年来首次来华进行友好访问的印度体育团队。1983年2月，第一次印中贸易和经济合作讨论会在新德里举行。4月，中华全国总工会代表团访问印度，这也是该工会代表团20多年来第一次访印。
1988年12月，拉吉夫?甘地对中国进行正式访问，这是自尼赫鲁1954年访华后时隔34年印度总理对中国的第一次访问，标志着中印关系实现正常化。冷战结束后，为了适应发生巨大变化的国内外形势，印度对华政策更加趋于务实，中印关系大体上健康发展。1992年5月，文卡塔拉曼对中国进行国事访问，为中印建交以来印度总统首次访华。10月下旬，印度内政部决定废除1962年限制中国人法。1993年1月，帕蒂尔访华，为中印建交以来印度议长首次访问中国。9月上旬，印度总理拉奥对中国进行正式友好访问，双方签订具有重要历史意义的《中华人民共和国政府和印度共和国政府关于在中印边境实际控制线地区保持和平与安宁的协定》。1994年6月，中印分别举行纪念双方共同倡导的和平共处五项原则发表40周年活动。10月，纳拉亚南访华，为1957年后印度副总统首次访华。1995年11月，乔石成为中印建交以来首次访印的全国人大常委会委员长。
1996年11月，江泽民对印度进行国事访问，为中国国家主席首次访印。双方强调要建立面向21世纪的建设性合作伙伴关系，并签署《中华人民共和国政府和印度共和国政府关于在中印边境实际控制线地区军事领域建立信任措施的协定》等文件，中印关系再度提升。1998年6月，总理瓦杰帕伊表示印度并不想同中国对抗，愿同中国在和平共处五项原则基础上建立友好、合作、睦邻、互利的关系。12月，外长辛格称印度致力于进一步改善对华关系，愿与中国重新开始正式对话，并期待通过全面对话解决两国所有悬而未决的问题，展现出更加积极的姿态。进入21世纪后，中印高层互访更加频繁。其中，2002年1月朱镕基对印度的正式友好访问，为中国总理时隔十多年后再次访印。2003年6月，印度总理瓦杰帕伊对中国进行正式访问，双方签署《中华人民共和国和印度共和国关系原则和全面合作的宣言》，决定任命边界问题特别代表，从两国关系大局的政治角度出发，探讨解决边界问题的框架。2005年4月，温家宝总理访问印度，双方宣布“建立面向和平与繁荣的战略合作伙伴关系”，签署《中华人民共和国政府和印度共和国政府关于解决中印边界问题政治指导原则的协定》等文件。2006年1月1日，胡锦涛主席和温家宝总理分别同卡拉姆总统和曼莫汉?辛格总理互致贺电，揭开中印“友好年”序幕。2008年1月，曼莫汉?辛格对中国进行正式访问，双方签署《中华人民共和国和印度共和国关于二十一世纪的共同展望》等多项文件，并出席“纪念柯棣华中印联合医疗队”成立仪式。2010年5月，帕蒂尔总统对中国进行国事访问，为印度国家元首十年来首次访华。12月，温家宝总理对印度进行正式访问，与印方共同宣布2011年为“中印交流年”。2013年10月，辛格总理访华，双方发表《中印战略合作伙伴关系未来发展愿景的联合声明》。2014年9月，习近平主席对印度进行国事访问，双方发表《中华人民共和国和印度共和国关于构建更加紧密的发展伙伴关系的联合声明》。2015年5月，莫迪总理正式访华，中印就构建两国更加紧密的发展伙伴关系等达成重要共识。此外，两国领导人多次在中印建交重要纪念周年（35、40、50、55、60、70周年）互致贺电。
中印在其他多个领域的关系也有长足发展。经贸方面，1992年7月，中印签署边境贸易出入境手续议定书，中断30年的中印边境贸易恢复。8月，两国企业合资创办的中印第一个小型钢铁合资企业在印度成立。2000年12月，“中国工程和商品展览会”在新德里举行，为中国首次在国外举办的以工程为主题的展览会。2002年3月，中国东方航空公司正式开通北京/上海至德里的直航客运业务。2003年10月，“印度制造”商品展在北京开幕，为印度第一次在中国举行商品展。2008年，中国首次超过美国成为印度第一大贸易伙伴（印度为中国第十大贸易伙伴）。2013年5月李克强总理访印期间，中印正式倡议共同建设孟中印缅经济走廊。文化方面，1992年12月，中国文化节首次在印度举行；1994年5月，首届印度文化节在北京开幕。2001年9月，首次“中印名人论坛”在新德里举行。2010年4月，在北京和新德里分别举办“印度节”和“中国节”。此外，中印还于2002年4月开始了反恐磋商，2005年1月开始举行战略对话，2011年9月至2018年4月举行了5次中印战略经济对话，2018年10月举行了首次中印执法安全高级别会晤。
在中印关系大体健康发展的过程中，印度方面也采取过对华极不友好的行动。1998年5月国防部长费尔南德斯多次发表讲话，污称中国是印度的“潜在头号威胁”，为印度发展核武器制造借口；2009年11月，印度政府“允准”达赖喇嘛再度往访达旺；印军在边境不时制造摩擦、对峙甚至流血冲突，令中印关系严重倒退、脱离正轨；2020年6月和9月，印度电子和信息技术部分别宣布禁用59款和118款中国App。
第三，不断提高军事的作用对印度对华关系产生重大影响。纵观近60年来中印关系发展的全过程，军事特别是边境地区的两军关系，成为影响印度国内舆论和政府决策至关重要的考量甚至决定因素。在1962年以后的印度对华态度和政策中，主要体现在边境地区局势上的军事关系的不友好或友好，既是印度对华政策的晴雨表，也成为被对华政策决定或影响政策决定的双刃剑。
1962年战争后至2020年，印度方面在边境地区制造严重事端的年头有28年，保持和平的年头为30年，两者大体相等。印军制造的事端主要有：侵入中国境内，侵入并设据点，越线活动（包括占控），以“探险”为名扩大越线，单方面改变边界走向，阻拦中方修路，向解放军挑衅，阻拦解放军巡逻，越线或抵近修路，越境修建观察所、铁丝网、搭建帐篷、建造“水渠”，军机入侵中国领空，恐吓、殴打中国边民，扣押中国牧民的牦牛，在边境地区搞大规模军演，以及性质更为严重的长时间对峙（20余小时到80余天不等）和冲突，有的甚至造成严重人员伤亡。其中，发生事端较多的年份为1963年、1965年、1998年、2008年、2014年、2015年、2020年。较为严重的事端（按发生时间先后）有：印军1963年3月在解放军撤离后趁机侵占乌热并设立据点，8月再次侵占中国巴里加斯地区；1965年9月在阿里地区向解放军巡逻队挑衅，12月在中锡边界达吉山口侵入中国境内并向中国边防人员武装挑衅；1967年9月在锡金边境与解放军发生冲突；1974年1月在中锡边境越境修筑观察所；1975年10月在中印边界东段土伦山口越过实控线向中方挑衅；1984年在什布奇山口修建铁丝网；1985年4月在达旺地区侵入中国境内筑工事、设据点；1986年深入洞朗地区设据点；1987年1月在察曲设据点；1987年上半年在边境地区进行代号为“棋盘”的大规模军事演习；1994年在东章地区设立据点，1996年又增设据点；1996年8月与解放军巡逻队在察隅对峙20余小时，1997年开始对典角地区越线巡逻；1998年11月与解放军巡逻队在藏南相遇并鸣枪，12月在东章地区扣留中国牧民的牦牛；1999年在东段边界设立据点，与解放军对峙30多小时，7—9月在东章地区与解放军对峙80余天；2000年6月在边境地区越线搭设帐篷；2006年3月单方面改变典角地区边界走向；2007年5月和2008年在西部边境地区越线恐吓、殴打中国边民；2008年越线在典角地区修建“棚屋”，在锡金段搞非法建筑物及尾随并阻拦解放军巡逻；2009年向“阿鲁纳恰尔邦”(我国藏南地区）增兵近6万，并增加火力，修建机场；2013年与解放军在拉达克地区发生“帐篷对峙”；2014年5月起以“探险”为名在西段逐步扩大越线，9月在多卡拉山口越过铁丝网拦阻解放军巡逻队并发生激烈对抗；2015年在东段阻拦中方修路；2016年3月在班公湖地区多次隐蔽修路；2017年4月在岗巴阻拦解放军巡逻队；2017年6月非法越过中印锡金段边界进入中国洞朗地区，制造了“洞朗事件”；2019年与解放军在拉达克短暂对峙；2020年6月与解放军在加勒万河谷发生冲突，造成重大人员伤亡；8月破坏前期双方多层级会谈会晤达成的共识，在班公湖南岸、热钦山口附近再次非法越线占控，公然挑衅，造成边境局势紧张；2021年9月与解放军在东章地区发生对峙和肢体冲突。在29年里，印度在陆地边境制造的事端共有50余起（均未占到什么便宜，甚至惨遭失败），严重污染甚至恶化了中印关系。
中印两军开始友好往来是在1990年之后。这30多年正值中印关系在多个领域健康发展的时期，虽然印度多次在边境地区和达赖问题上制造事端，但中印两军之间展开了多个级别、多种形式的友好交往和合作，为中印关系的总体发展起到了十分积极的作用。主要事件有：1990年11月举行了中印双方边防人员首次会晤；1991一2016年有多个军种的代表团进行了30余次互访；1992—2018年两国国防部长多次互访，其中1992年7月帕瓦尔访华为中印建交以来印度国防部长首次访华；2004年3月中央军委副主席、国务委员兼国防部长曹刚川访印，双方就进一步加强两军友好合作达成共识；2006年6月印度防长慕克吉访华并签署《中印国防部防务领域交流与合作谅解备忘录》；2012年9月国务委员兼国防部长梁光烈访印，双方达成多项共识。双方还在1994年2月开始举行中印外交军事专家小组会议，1995—2012年双方军舰进行了近10次互访，2003—2019年两军多次举行联合军演和联合反恐训练，2008—2016年双方举行了8次防务安全磋商。此外，2004年双方边境部队官兵举行了共同庆祝印度独立日和庆祝中华人民共和国国庆节的活动。
2017年后，印度对华态度发生重大变化，印军在边境地区制造的事端大都演变成危机，这既是出于印度国内政治的需要，也试图服务于印度领导人的大国雄心，印军针对中国的军事冒险行动越来越被赋予豪赌的意涵，在很大程度上成为印度政府对华政策的筹码。
五、结语
近60年来，印度在不健康心态驱使下，对华发表和做出种种消极言行，其根源大多可追溯到从精英到民众对边界问题特别是1962年战争的认知。为了实现国内团结和争取更多外部援助，尽管印度军队的“理念和能力与解放军至少有30年的差距”，但印度的政治精英们仍不时渲染甚至制造中国在军事、经济、地缘政治等方面对印度的“威胁”，为此不惜维持高企的军费预算，常年把1/3左右的重兵和最先进的武器装备部署在中印边境地区，与美、日、澳等国博势取实，把边界纠纷当成了转移国内民怨、彰显印度国际影响力的手段，使得边界问题变成政治工具和政治博弈的棋子。我们也要看到，国家间关系的起伏冷热，不仅是地缘政治的得失取舍，更有其深层次的思想文化渊源。人们认为，印度是个发展中国家，跟我们有着共同的命运。这个定位是符合客观事实的。然而，印度的政治精英还有另外一种考虑：以尼赫鲁为代表的印度精英，自认为是高加索人种、婆罗门种姓，说英语，受牛桥（Oxbridge）教育，是如假包换的准西方人，甚至传出尼赫鲁跟英国皇亲搞婚外精神恋的绯闻。无独有偶，我国的东邻早年就出了个“脱亚入欧”的。这些人从心态上俯视中国、藐视中国。1962年对印自卫反击战中国打败了印军，但是没有打服印度的统治精英，由此产生的难以名状的复杂情绪，影响了这些精英（无论其出身如何）自那场战争结束以来近一个甲子的决策过程。
无论是从印度自身的发展需要出发，还是从地区关系和国际关系来看，自20世纪50年代后期开始曲折前行的中印关系，曾有多次机会可在急速下滑或跌入低谷后尽快重回正轨，但印度不能准确研判形势，甚至还误判了形势，屡屡错失通过与中国友好合作、相向而行、共同发展，在国际上提升其地位、扩大其影响的良机。作为与印度有着几千年友好交往历史的邻国，在世界“百年未有之大变局”下，我们既要对中印边界争端的复杂性、解决问题的长期性和中印关系发展的曲折性有足够的心理准备，充分认识到不时制造麻烦的“难缠”的印度将是影响中国和平发展、推动“一带一路”倡议的国际成本的重要因素，多方面做好预判、精准应对，也要继续保持把中印关系置于我国“亲、诚、惠、容”的周边外交政策框架之内的定力，坚定信心，努力培育、发展和利用一切积极力量，与各方一道，使中印关系重回正轨，造福于亚洲各国和世界人民。
（作者：孟庆龙，系中国社会科学院世界历史研究所研究员）
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