Original link: https://wmdpd.com/zhuan-leng-zhan-hou-de-wu-ge-zhan-lue-ji-yu-qi-xia/
Fourth Opportunity Period. The second half of 2016 (starting with the South China Sea standoff and the election of Trump) to early 2020 . There are six international bases for this Opportunity Period. First, the comparison of military power between China and the United States is undergoing or has undergone substantial changes, leading to changes in the geopolitical situation, and there seem to be all kinds of extremely serious and difficult problems within the military industry of the US military. Second, Trump is very peaceful. The third is that Trump’s policy of denying Obama’s legacy and his “America First” ruling idea have too many side effects, seriously hurting the diplomatic united front work. Fourth, the relationship between the U.S. government, military, and love is still chaotic in the Trump era. Fifth, Trump hastily launched a chaotic trade war and technology war, which has led the world to see that China has the courage and ability to conduct a comprehensive and long-term fierce battle with the United States in terms of economy and technology. People are afraid of a big change. Sixth, the attacks of the Trump era have profoundly changed the international faction of China .
Many of the fundamental aspects here will be long-standing , extending well beyond this Opportunity Period, and will not be listed in the discussion of the next Opportunity Period .
About foundation one. The first is to look at the military. Marked by the three 111 events from 2007 to 2011 (the anti-satellite experiment, the mid-course anti-missile experiment and the J-20 test flight were carried out successively on January 11 in 2007, 2010, and 2011), after that, the level of China’s armament increased by leaps and bounds (I don’t list it here). The long list goes on), some important technologies (like hypersonics) seem to surpass the US.
The military situation in the Western Pacific is changing rapidly. Among them, the confrontation in the South China Sea in July 2016 may be a watershed event , indicating that at least in the first island chain, when there is a danger of serious armed conflict between China and the United States, China will probably have the upper hand. China’s victory in this confrontation is obvious , whether it is the continuous militarization of the islands after that, or the change in the attitudes of the surrounding countries, or the generals of both sides who commanded the confrontation, Golden Dragon Shen and Harris’ subsequent careers all point to this. a conclusion. For example, you can check golden dragon Shen’s shocking resume from July 2016. Furthermore, from the point of view of the time node, this matter may be related to the formation of the nuclear heart three months later, which in turn greatly strengthens China’s political power against the United States. In addition, the psychological impact of the confrontation on the US military may continue to this day. In short, this incident, coupled with the fact that the United States has nothing worth mentioning in the first island chain in the next few years, I am afraid that the mentality of all parties in the Western Pacific game has changed significantly. The United States has many Western Pacific allies. The image in his eyes is no longer so conspicuous and powerful. For them, trying to avoid getting into conflict is far more important than standing in line .
In addition to the development of the military industry, the other two factors of high importance are the military XX and the reform of the military system . In the latter, I will not talk about the aspects of combat and military construction (because I do not understand), but it is worth emphasizing that the former is a major advantage of our country to the United States . Judging from the public news , the United States’ response in this regard is not on the same order of magnitude as China’s (the quantity and intensity of processing) , even if the media reports on everything from sky-high purchases or waste to transaction frauds to shocking scandals in Iraq and Afghanistan.
On the other hand, the U.S. military has some unexpected things from time to time, which seem to indicate that some of its internal problems are so serious that they have gone beyond the scope of corruption and waste that ordinary people understand . I give two examples. The first example is that the United States invested hundreds of millions of dollars in training Syrian opposition fighters. As a result, a few years later, the commander of the Central Command publicly admitted in Congress that only four to five fighters were trained to participate in the battles the United States wanted. incredible? Fake News? You can search for “US has trained only ‘four or five’ Syrian fighters”. The second example, the result of the US Department of Defense audit is that there are accounts of trillions or even ten trillion dollars that are unclear, and this is the case every year. . This is not a conspiracy theory, it is an official report, reported by the mainstream media. If you don’t believe me, you can search for “US Army fudged its accounts by trillions”, “pentagon missing 6.5 trillion dollars”, “Pentagon Racks Up $35 Trillion”. This level of problem cannot be explained by corruption or waste (although it may be related to both). It seems that the military’s financial system has fallen into chaos . Now it is not a question of corruption or waste, but a question of whether the financial situation can be technically clarified .
About foundation two. Many people think that Trump is tough on China, but he is not. Come to think of it, Trump is the most peaceful of any U.S. president in 40 years (after Carter). Apart from killing the Iranian general, he had no military action worth mentioning (even this one seems to have been misled by him). In terms of major military incidents against China, Trump has zero . The previous three could keep Chinese leaders awake and make their foreheads sweat from nervousness. Trump only does the first thing. As for the reason, it may be related to the results of contests such as the confrontation in the South China Sea, but I am afraid it is also related to Trump’s own behavior and judgment.
The actual power of the top leaders of world powers in foreign military affairs is a very important matter. According to common sense, it is not easy for him to launch major foreign military operations, involving authorization, chain of command, and preparations for war. Note that here I am referring to active initiation (rather than an emergency response that follows a pre-planned process like a nuclear counterattack). However, it should be easier for him to make his country unable to initiate military action through inaction. Therefore , Trump’s high level of peace should be fully recognized . Think about it, after 2016, is there any idea within the United States that it wants to find a place for the confrontation in the South China Sea? In the past two years, some political forces (including some originally marginalized people) who have been extremely hostile to China in the United States have used the opportunity of Trump’s trade war to make waves and seem to have the tendency to hijack Trump’s policy to a certain extent. Meet people and ideas? The results of it? Nothing happened.
Regarding the third foundation, the most famous is that Trump immediately abolished the TPP as soon as he took office. However, the far-reaching impact is that Obama attaches great importance to international outlook and United Front allies, and Trump seriously damaged the United Front work of the United States in the process of completely denying Obama. Do all kinds of ridiculous things. The America First policy has a similar effect. In short, allies’ expectations of the United States have undergone irreversible changes, and even if Trump leaves, its negative impact will be difficult to eliminate in the short term, which is what European leaders have said publicly. This benefits China, which is already good at undermining the unity of its adversaries.
Explain why allies’ destabilizing expectations of the United States cannot be easily dispelled with Trump’s departure. Mainly because Trump represents the uncontrollable rise of American populism, and it is doubtful whether this can be suppressed by the return of the Democratic establishment when Biden takes office . Yes, many are predicting that the 2020 election could lead to a point of no return for the Republican Party (especially if Texas becomes a Democratic blue state), as changes in the racial structure will lead to the current style of the Republican Party (either establishment or coercion). populist) is unlikely to win the election. However, once this happens, there is bound to be a risk of a split between the establishment and the now powerful democratic socialist (left-wing populist) faction within the Democratic Party. To stabilize international expectations, the establishment must suppress the populism of the two local factions at the same time , which is not an easy task.
About foundation four. At the beginning of Trump’s presidency, General Flynn, the national security adviser, was forced to resign. This not only puts the hat on Trump’s head (which he can’t get rid of so far), and seriously hinders the original plan of alliance with Russia , which was not hopeful, but also is a preview of the failure of Trump’s relationship with the generals later. Originally, he attached great importance to attracting the army, and the core team released a lot of soldiers, but within two or three years after Flynn, generals such as McMaster, Kelly, and Mattis who held key positions were driven away or abandoned the ship, and the relationship between the government and the military changed. in trouble. It also severely limits Trump’s ability to play the security game . In a situation where both security and diplomatic united front are weak, his focus is on the economic game.
About foundation five. (Continued from previous paragraph) So what about the economic game? Obviously, the decisive game is against China. Yet Trump’s chaotic trade war technology war has led to the squandering of U.S. advantages. Regarding the trade war, I was very negative on the US in 2018 when it started. It’s not that you can’t fight, but you must plan carefully, organize carefully, prepare for major sacrifices, and then go all out to do it, otherwise you will suffer a big loss . The boss takes the initiative to fight the second child. If the tie is tied, it is actually a loss, because it reveals that his strength is similar to that of the second child. If you lose, you will lose a lot. If it’s just a small win, it’s just no profit or loss, because this is what people think the boss deserves. Only by winning more and more obvious is success. To win more, you have to play big . If the momentum is big but it is actually a small fight, it will still be a loss, because people will think that the boss is rude. If the second child is very strong, there are three preparations to prepare for the big game. The first is to concentrate strength, the second is to unite within oneself, and the third is to prepare for long-term struggle . None of the three prepared the Trump regime, and they even exposed that they had no good plan. How many times has Trump repeatedly jumped in the past two years? Has it been dragged into a protracted war by our country? Has the United States engaged in a fuel-filling tactic? Did he finally show his talent and had to stop the anticlimactic hastily? Victory is not obvious? What does this mean in the eyes of the rest of the world? Economically, China is an equal opponent to the United States, and the strength of China’s economy is not only reflected in statistics .
Technology warfare has a similar problem. Of course, I can’t say how serious Huawei’s technical dilemma is, but at least it’s still standing still and the report is not bad. The United States has consumed too many resources on this matter and the effect has fallen far short of expectations . From the perspective of a third party, the concept of American technological hegemony has also suffered a lot : “Leading is leading, but it doesn’t seem that scary, and the United States also lags far behind (5G, etc.).”
About foundation six. Trump’s economic fight against China also has an important political consequence. I mentioned above that there is a split between internationalists and localists in the United States, and at least the localists are seriously split. On the other hand, China’s international school has grown slowly with the rise of China. However, events such as trade wars, technology wars, Meng case, Hong Kong affairs (probably not the Trump administration’s actions), and the targeting of Tik Tok (which happened during the fifth strategic opportunity period) have seriously affected China’s not yet strong international faction. blow . A large part of these forces may have to accept the asylum of the local Chinese faction . The teacher’s analysis of the weakness of the national bourgeoisie nearly a hundred years ago is still not out of date. In this way, the Chinese side will be very concentrated in the struggle between China and the United States. Focusing on long-term struggles rather than temporary gains and losses, I think it’s good for China.
The six basics are explained. At the beginning of 2020, the situation is very good. Trump, in particular, looks set to be re-elected, and many of his regime’s weaknesses are likely to continue. Just as I was rejoicing, the situation suddenly accelerated. The fifth strategic opportunity period fell from the sky.
Fifth opportunity period. Start with the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic.
In addition to some bases extended from the previous ones, there are seven more international bases for this Opportunity Period. First, the development of the epidemic, especially in the United States. Second, the economic and social crisis in the United States continues to break out. Third, the US government-military relationship has further deteriorated. Fourth, breakthroughs have been made in China’s high-tech social governance. Fifth, the nuclear war endgame situation, the biological warfare situation and the anti-terrorism situation have greatly benefited my country’s changes. Sixth, Putin’s political life has been extended after he revised the constitution. Seventh , the strategic gap of “offshore balance, divide and rule” by China in US politics should have been opened. In addition, the outcome of the fight against India may also have importance (though I’m not sure unless Modi decides to play big).
The reality corresponding to Basics 1 and 2 does not need to be explained, everyone is very familiar with it. I will only add three more points. First, it is still unknown whether the vaccine has saved the epidemic in the United States (after all, many people refuse the vaccine). Second, the so-called united anti-China issue due to the epidemic should be seen more clearly now, but it cannot be done . The epidemic situation in continental Europe has basically stabilized. Has it started in Europe? Japan, South Korea and Southeast Asia are not engaged, right? The United States still does not know when it will be able to do the Western condensation nuclei again, and maybe never again. Third, the rapid rebound of China’s economy seems to have occurred.
The main economic consequences I estimate are at least three. First , the importance of the Chinese market in the world will be greatly increased , and a market much larger than the United States will be formed (it was already about the same size as the United States before the epidemic). Second, the Chinese industrial chain or the industrial chain centered on China has shown strong robustness , which, combined with the previously recognized comprehensive advantages of efficiency-cost-network, further proves China’s manufacturing advantages . Third, the United States has suffered a severe setback , and people of insight in various countries are probably already seriously thinking about major issues such as the future of the US dollar .
The consequences of international diplomacy are also numerous (besides the economic consequences of increased diplomatic power).
Take medical diplomacy , for example. This has now been carried out, and it is also a major advantage of our country. In the future, regardless of whether we come up with the vaccine first, China will definitely exert a huge influence on the popularization of the vaccine. After all, many developing countries are not only enough to have the vaccine, but also need the assistance of the international community to promote the vaccine to the grassroots level.
Another example is high- tech social governance diplomacy . Many countries should be envious of China’s high-tech social governance, especially the developing countries that are already envious of China’s economic achievements and some countries that have a strong need to maintain stability. In the future, China will not only be able to ” provide a plan to get rich whoever comes to power ” as before, but also ” provide a plan to maintain stability for anyone who comes to power”. In fact, Western think tanks are already very worried about this matter.
Regarding foundation three, just look at the events in June. Esper, Milley, Mattis, Powell and a bunch of other military leaders jumped back. The military headquarters issued a notice to the whole army only to protect the constitution and not to mention the commander-in-chief, while Trump responded to the current Secretary of Defense Esper and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Milley. Not even scolding. And earlier, the Secretary of the Navy, who was supported by Trump, was forced to resign (due to the USS Theodore Roosevelt incident). It’s not a day or two that the intelligence community has complained that Trump doesn’t read intelligence. The sudden closure of the Chinese consulate, which resulted in the instantaneous loss of the U.S. consulate in Chengdu, an important intelligence-gathering center, also seems to indicate that there is a major problem with the internal coordination between intelligence services and the government. In short, since Obama, the US government-military relationship has been ruined for more than ten years. Even if Biden takes office, it will take a lot of energy and a lot of time to straighten it out (even if he is straightened out). Therefore , the ability of the United States to play a security game against China will be severely limited by internal chaos for some time to come . In fact, given Biden’s energy and the fact that he came from the chaotic Obama regime, I don’t have much hope that he can sort things out.
About foundation four. China’s experimental interest in high-tech social governance is inherently strong, while the West is influenced by liberal ideology and anti-intellectualism, coupled with the relatively weak organizational strength of the political system and relatively weak infrastructure capabilities, it is not as aggressive as China. Before the epidemic, China had successful high-intensity experiments in local areas. The epidemic caused China to suddenly engage in a national-scale experiment in high-tech governance (including information technology and biotechnology) without preparation, with excellent results . Western countries are either far less effective than China, or can’t do it at all (such as the United States). In this regard, China has already opened one level in Europe and two levels in the United States . Next, China is bound to accelerate technological change in social governance and economic management with great confidence and high social consensus. In terms of technological change, China’s political and social awareness may be no less advantageous than 5G technology .
After entering the Internet era, China and the United States have risen. In terms of the ability to use information technology to transform society, some people think that the two are half-hearted, and some people think that the United States is stronger. Now it seems that in the next era, China may have to overtake the corner.
The intelligence personnel in the embassies and consulates of various countries in China are shocked by China’s fight against the epidemic. This time China’s display of power in high-tech governance is comparable to the US’s display of power in high-tech warfare during the 1991 Gulf War . Although due to the suppression of political correctness, it is difficult for some countries to publicly promote China, but the key information may have been passed on to insightful people who are watching the door rather than watching the excitement. I believe its effect will gradually appear in the future.
About foundation five. Let’s start with the nuclear war . People like to say that there is no winner in a nuclear war, and they like to stop when the game progresses to a large-scale nuclear war. this is not right. At least many Cold War strategists disagree. There are many game points in the post-nuclear war. One of them is the central incapacitation, whether other less damaged areas can avoid the collapse of the social structure after the core city is destroyed . This unprepared outbreak proves that the autonomous decision-making ability (January 23-24) and action ability of local organizations in China are very strong, while those in the United States are much worse.
What is especially striking is that this epidemic shows that a considerable proportion of the Chinese people have reached the point where they can automatically enter a wartime state almost unconsciously . When the proportion of such masses is high to a certain extent, they will automatically and quickly attach themselves to the self-organized condensation nucleus (party organizations at all levels), virtually deterring those who do not want to condense and easily coercing the middle masses . The whole society showed that the masses quickly had a high degree of consciousness, were extremely united, and had an extremely fighting spirit. The whole process does not require the organization to violate public opinion and impose a high degree of compulsion, no need to bribe, and no need to resort to brainwashing . This is no longer a simple performance of superb organizational skills, but a manifestation of national character. This of course greatly reduces the difficulty of organization. I suspect that this also surprised the high-level people in the party and government, after all, we have not done large-scale testing in the post-Cold War era.
Another point related to the above is, if the social structure breaks down for a while, what are the political options for the remnants of the population? This has made Western strategists (like Kissinger) shudder since the 1950s. In a country like China and the Soviet Union, if a large number of government personnel die in a nuclear war, what will happen to the rest of the people? In fact, there is not much suspense. The surviving administrative personnel gather with the living party members, rebuild the grassroots organizations under the banner of the party or the army to save themselves , see if they can contact the same organizations in other regions, and then expand the organization in a snowball manner. Economically it was wartime communist rationing . In short, as long as the West can’t send an occupying army, the world will still belong to the Communist Party . However, the Western system is probably far from such robustness . Can you imagine the existence of a capitalist representative system when a large number of executives and social elites have been killed by nuclear weapons or hidden in bunkers for a long time? Can you imagine that the inviolability of private property (the cornerstone of capitalism) will still be observed at that time? This is only the dilemma of the Cold War. Now the degree of Fira in the West has risen sharply. The first is the immersion of neoliberalism for decades , and the second is the prevalence of anti-intellectualism (especially in the United States and Britain) . This epidemic has fully exposed this, and I am afraid that it has also surprised people of insight in the United States, especially the fact that the performance of the United States is at least one grade worse than that of Europe. If a full-scale nuclear war breaks out, the true rulers of the United States may be able to hide underground, but some political monsters will grow in the post-war American wasteland outside, and the world is almost certain.
The above situation means that China ‘s psychological advantages in the extreme game at the juncture of nuclear war have been greatly enhanced . These advantages are invaluable if you think that the United States will have a strong urge to take risks in times of crisis and when China is overtaken.
The changes in the counter-terrorism situation and the biological warfare situation are easier to understand. Seeing that so many countries have been knocked down by the virus, people with ulterior motives around the world have long been imagining it. Responsible nations have to rethink counterterrorism systems and biological warfare strategies . The achievements in the fight against the epidemic show that my country has great advantages in these areas.
About foundation six. It should be no problem for the triangular relationship to continue to be stable for more than ten years. In addition, it should be noted that the mutual trust between China and Russia in the military strategy has reached a very high level . Let’s take a look at Russia’s public nuclear strategy and some exercise announcements in previous years. For example, the document “Russian Federation’s State Policy Basis in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence” signed by Putin in June 2020 pointed out the “red line” of Russia’s use of nuclear weapons : “The enemy uses nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction against Russia and its allies; Russia conducts non-nuclear aggression and threatens Russia’s survival and its nuclear counterattack; has accurate information to determine that the enemy will launch ballistic missile attacks on Russian territory or/and the territory of Russian allies; the enemy launches attacks on Russia’s extremely important countries or military installations , when the Russian nuclear strike force was paralyzed.” Note the words “allies” and “accurate intelligence determination”.
More than ten years later, China, which has long used the ” global deterrence war ” as the guidance of the Rocket Force, should establish sufficient nuclear deterrence against the United States (the public slogans of nuclear expansion have been shouted). In this case, even if Sino-Russian relations are alienated at that time, the problem will not be big (China and Russia will be alienated at most after Putin, and it is almost impossible to have a big confrontation). Some entrants think that China’s long-term lack of nuclear weapons is a Showa-style gamble, and I also have some doubts. But at least for now, even if there is a big gamble, the gamble will eventually be won due to the long-term and effective maintenance of the triangular relationship by three generations of leaders since the 1990s, the incompetence of the US leadership and Putin’s righteousness.
About foundation seven. In the past, China was mainly good at attracting international factions and their political representatives through economic, trade and financial interests. After fighting for a while with Trump, who is based on the local faction, China and the local American faction are not acquainted with each other . In this case, does China have an opportunity to engage in some kind of offshore balance with the United States? In particular, if the two populists in the United States cannot be suppressed by the establishment, and the princes of Russia and the Middle East will inevitably end up infiltrating and intervening, the situation will be wonderful .
This is a big opportunity. I don’t know if China can catch it, and I’ll watch it when the Democratic Party comes to power. Interestingly, even if China does nothing, it still creates a huge political deterrent to the United States . The strategic gap for the United States to be seriously interfered in its internal affairs by foreign forces has been opened (mainly to blame himself), and even if China is squatting in the hole and can’t see it, it is a Cthulhu and a Voldemort. Look at how hysterically the United States has played up the threat of Chinese infiltration in the past two years. The American people have gradually accepted that both Russia and China have a strong ability to intervene in internal affairs. Have you ever thought about the price of the political parties in the United States who are in full swing?
The seven basics are explained. Looking to the future, due to the epidemic, due to China’s monolithic politics, Russia’s Putin’s life extension and the 1920s economic, social and political compound crisis that the United States has entered, the current strategic opportunity period will last at least 5 to 10 years . Then accelerate the sixth opportunity period. After the fifth opportunity period, the ability of the United States to contain China will be greatly weakened, and in turn, China’s containment of the United States may exceed the United States’ containment of China . Let’s see.
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