Eleven years ago, Mark Anderson wrote his famous essay, “Why is software eating the world? “.
Tech stocks were at their valuation trough at the time, and Apple was worth just over $300 billion (now $2.7 trillion). Silicon Valley is still arguing over the high valuations of Facebook and Twitter. Anderson, who founded A16Z and has invested in the companies, felt compelled to speak out: “We are in the midst of a dramatic technological and economic change, with software companies poised to take over much of the economy.”
From retail to finance to energy, he listed a variety of industries that will be taken over, including the software industry itself: traditional software companies such as Oracle and Microsoft are being challenged by new players such as Salesforce. In 2020, Salesforce surpassed Oracle to become the most expensive enterprise software company by market value.
In the business world, new kings replace old kings, rarely because they are coming from behind on the same runway. The “software” in Anderson’s article and the “software” that Salesforce founder and former Oracle employee Benioff was committed to building is a new thing: Internet-based software, SaaS, Software as a Service, software as a service. It is a set of standardized software in the cloud, which is charged on an annual and per-volume basis, which can reduce operation and maintenance costs and achieve predictable growth. In fact, the browser Netscape founded by Anderson himself is a kind of to C (for individual consumers) SaaS.
The focus on SaaS has since spread to the Chinese primary market. In 2014, there were 479 investment events in China’s enterprise service field, mainly enterprise software, more than double the amount of the previous year, and the investment amount was 24.3 billion yuan, more than five times that of the previous year.
But over the past 8 years, SaaS has gradually changed from a sought-after concept to a complex investor. China has yet to see a SaaS company with a market value of over US$10 billion.
The focus of industry discussions includes whether SaaS is suitable for the Chinese business environment. A joke is that the valuations of Moutai and Salesforce are quite reasonable, because sales in the United States rely on Salesforce, and sales in China rely on Moutai; it also includes the authenticity of SaaS: the original school believes that the cloud , Standardization, annual, and per-volume fees are SaaS. The reformists believe that local deployment and regular operation and maintenance fees are also SaaS…
Among the many areas of enterprise software that SaaS can “eat”, electronic signatures epitomize these debates.
The main function of e-signature is to help companies or individuals sign contracts online. China’s e-signature industry has a history of 20 years, and dozens of companies have been born successively. After the epidemic, big technology companies such as Tencent and ByteDance have also launched their own e-signature products. It started in the period of traditional software deployed locally and was transformed by SaaS after 2014. However, due to the slow development of SaaS and low early income, practitioners have swayed this business model again, and only a few can maintain the SaaS form. Many companies choose to save the country from the curve, while working on local deployment projects with immediate income, and at the same time making SaaS products with better business models in the long run.
But Shangshangsi, which was founded in 2014, has been playing a straight ball: do SaaS, and only do SaaS. It also wants to make the field more network effects. Compared with to C Internet services, in to B enterprise services, the network effect is scarce or weak, but Shangshangsign believes that it has found the possibility of building a network.
Wan Min, the founder of Shangshangsign, is not from software or Internet technology, nor is he a veteran of a vertical industry – these are the two most common founders of enterprise services, either with technology or industry knowledge.
Wan Min is a learning-oriented, strategic, persistent and even stubborn founder. Her insistence on a pure SaaS form, with network effects based on it, is rare when most of her peers have compromised.
Compared with the to C market with clear pricing and simple purchase process, the to B field is more gray, but Wanmin stipulates that the sales signed on the list cannot give rebates to customer purchasers. She will write a long article on her personal account to analyze the data content and inflated financing amount of competitors – this is regarded by some people as something that does not need to be said.
Investor and partner of Matrix Partners Xiong Fei, who signed on Shanghai, commented that Wan Min is “a little lonely” in the business world. He hopes to see her succeed and see that people with persistence can find their place in the business jungle.
It is not difficult to do SaaS, but it is difficult to do SaaS only
Wan Min founded Shanghai Signing in August 2014. She is not the kind of CEO who emphasizes her foresight. She told LatePost that she wanted to do Shanghai Signing at first because she wanted to be a benchmark for DocuSign, which adopts the SaaS model: “In the beginning, I had no idea what to do. Seeing how fascinating this track is, I just thought I could give it a try because China doesn’t have DocuSign yet.”
DocuSign is a US electronic signature company established in 2003. In March 2014, it raised $85 million at a valuation of $1.6 billion.
At that time, Wan Min was well aware of the cumbersome nature of paper contracts: many procedures, long mailing times, and troublesome storage later. Electronic signatures can greatly improve efficiency and reduce costs. A paper contract that can be signed by mail in three days to a week can be completed in an hour with electronic signatures. Since the postage and labor are saved, the cost is only one tenth of the paper contract. The SaaS model used by DocuSign made her see the possibility of large-scale promotion of electronic signatures in China.
Before this, China’s electronic visa market has a history of 10 years.
In 2002, the Chinese government implemented a paperless office, and the “Electronic Signature Law of the People’s Republic of China” was drafted in the same year (effective in 2005), providing legal protection for electronic contracts.
A group of e-seal software companies with government and enterprises as their core customers are emerging, mainly in the local deployment mode, that is, tailor-made software for customer needs and deploy it in the customer’s own IT environment (local computer room or data center).
In the following ten years, the popularity of electronic visas has been limited, and there have been no major companies in the industry, nor has it attracted capital attention.
This is because the growth rate of the traditional software model is not high, and its products are customized, and products between different customers may not be reused; if you want to expand customers and revenue, you have to put more manpower to develop projects for different customers; it The bulk of revenue is a one-time purchase and deployment fee that is not sustainable.
SaaS has the opposite qualities. It serves all customers with a set of cloud-standardized products, and the more you sell, the lower the marginal cost. It’s an annual, per-volume fee, not a one-time sale, which enables SaaS companies to do a good job of attracting “lease renewals,” while achieving consistent revenue and predictable growth.
The same is done for electronic signatures, whether the SaaS model is adopted or not, the business results are very different. Taking Jiangxi Jinge and Anzhengtong, which have been listed on the New Third Board, as examples, the two electronic seal software companies were both established in 2003, and their 2016 revenues were 40 million and 33 million yuan respectively. And DocuSign’s 2017 revenue was $380 million. Since its listing in 2018 to the end of 2021, DocuSign’s single-quarter revenue has increased from $156 million to $581 million, and its current market value is close to $20 billion, with a market share of more than 70% in the United States.
In 2014, when Shangshang was established, there were not a few people who saw the superiority of the SaaS model like Wan Min.
With DocuSign and other US SaaS companies becoming unicorns one after another, Chinese VCs once again adopted the “Copy to China” strategy when investing in the Internet. In the e-signature market, there are a large number of new companies that have received venture capital or traditional software companies that have announced the transformation of the SaaS model: Cloud Sign, Fada, Shangshang Sign, eSign Bao, and Yibaoquan have successively obtained financing.
At first, it was not difficult for them to do standardized SaaS. At that time, the e-signature industry had a rapidly growing customer base: Internet financial platforms.
In 2014, China’s mutual gold platforms surged from less than 600 in the previous year to more than 2,200. It needs to send loan contracts to a large number of individual users.
In this scenario, the contract amount is small, the quantity is large, and the coverage area is wide, which is suitable for electronic contracts with high efficiency and high speed. It also determines the product characteristics of the electronic signature at this stage: a thin, standardized tool product that can be used by accessing the mutual gold APP with API. This is a B2C (business to individual) one-way scenario.
Wan Min said that at that time it was not difficult to get customers to be quick and easy. Shangshangsign launched its first signing tool product in early 2015, quickly acquiring the first batch of customers. In that year, 70% of their customers were mutual gold companies. According to the data of Suning Financial Research Institute, from 2014 to September 2018, the mutual fund industry signed a total of 4.831 billion electronic contracts, and in 2017 alone, there were 1.814 billion.
But after 2017, SaaS, which has been favored by many companies, has become more of a story in BP, and it is difficult to fall into execution.
The average unit price of contracted tool SaaS products is less than 100,000 yuan. For a group of companies that were newly established or transformed into SaaS after 2014, the product revenue has gradually become difficult to support subsequent financing.
Xiong Fei, a partner of Jingwei Ventures, has led the investment in PingCAP, Beisen, Taimei Medical and other star to B companies. He is the first investor signed by Shanghai. Xiong Fei told LatePost that under the pressure of growth, enterprise service companies have two paths:
One is to do some local deployment projects, the unit price is higher, and more income can be obtained in the short term. Some non-Internet large customers in traditional industries, especially state-owned enterprises, want to master data by themselves, and they are willing to pay higher costs for this. Some local deployment projects of electronic signatures cost hundreds of thousands or even millions of yuan. The second is to continue to do cloud-standardized SaaS and make products deeper. Xiong Fei observed that most companies in the e-signature industry have chosen the former, and Shangshang is one of the very few companies that only do SaaS.
“It’s a question of sweetness and bitterness, or bitterness and sweetness.” Xiong Fei said, “On-premises deployment can increase revenue faster, but when you have more than a dozen customers, it is easy to maintain. As customers increase, each The number of customer versions is different, and there are more or less customized functions. The further back you go, the higher the operation and maintenance cost and the heavier the burden. SaaS has a small income volume in the early stage, but it has better scale in the long run, with 300 customers and 10 customers. There is no difference in operation and maintenance, and it is convenient for customers to renew their contracts.”
There is also an industry view that doing some customized projects with high customer unit price does not affect the company’s SaaS business at the same time. Entrepreneurship is to take into account the immediate survival and future growth. There have been similar voices inside the Shangshang sign.
But Wan Min is very insistent on SaaS content.
In 2017, the Shangshang sales team won 2 projects with more than 3 million yuan, the total amount is equivalent to more than 70 standardized SaaS customers at that time.
The sales hoped for Wan Min’s special approval, but was rejected. The co-founder at the time also disagreed with Wan Min’s judgment. He believed that startups were not qualified to pick customers and should not give the money they got to their peers.
Wan Min told him that local deployment seems to be expensive, but it is actually a low-margin project with lots of people. The more you receive, the more you lose. Startup companies have limited resources, and dispersing their forces to take on meaningless projects will only make the company farther away from the goal of SaaS.
“Once this opening is opened, the company will not be able to go back,” Wan Min said. When the sales team and company management find that localized and customized projects are more profitable in the short term and can convince most investors, the company will Will be dragged down the traditional software route that is easy in the present but painful in the future.
She believes that even in the face of large customers, cloud-based standardized products have advantages.
In the case of lower cost, its performance is more guaranteed, because SaaS companies can maintain and upgrade products in the cloud in a more timely manner.
Xin Nan, the head of the HR electronic signing project of Debon Express, a logistics company that introduced Shanghai Sign in 2020, said that when choosing electronic signature products, Debon Express most values stable performance and convenient signing.
The labor contracts and resignation contracts of Debon Express’s subsidiaries across the country have been online, and more than 500,000 electronic contracts are signed every year. A stable user experience is especially important for employees and recruiters. The lower price and shorter deployment time of standard SaaS is also one of the factors considered by Debon Express.
Standardized products can lead to more standard and continuous service.
ZTO is one of the first logistics companies to introduce electronic signatures. In 2018, they purchased a localized electronic signature software. They found that traditional electronic signature companies are thinking of selling software, “sell it to you and it’s over. It is useless for executives to urge them to change.” said the person in charge of the e-signature project of the legal department of Zhongtong.
After signing up on Shanghai in 2019, ZTO’s experience is that SaaS products deployed in the cloud are more responsive. This is because when purchasing localized software, it is the implementers who are most familiar with the customer’s environment. However, the implementers will constantly move to new projects and cannot deal with the problems of old customers. Moreover, because the products are local, it is sometimes difficult for the customer service team to locate the problem. When using SaaS, customers and service personnel see the same set of products in the cloud, which can locate and solve problems faster.
Wan Min’s insistence on SaaS lies in her belief in time.
DocuSign was 11 years old when it became a unicorn in 2014. In the internal training course of Shanghai Signing, Wan Min explained the growth characteristics of SaaS to employees: “The lotus flowers in a pond will open twice as many times as the previous day. May I ask which day the lotus flowers are half open?”
The answer is “Day 29”, the speed of the last day, which is the sum of the previous 29 days. Although the growth rate is slow in the early stage, once a certain inflection point is exceeded, the growth curve of the SaaS model will become steeper.
From tools to platforms, capturing potential network effects
In 2017, when we resisted the pressure of income and did not do customized projects, another thing happened. It accelerated the process of SaaS commercialization that was originally envisaged to be slow and then fast, but it also made Shangshang sign the most stressful situation since its establishment. time.
In the second half of 2017, Wan Min accidentally learned Metcalfe’s law describing network effects in a business school course: the network value increases exponentially with the number of nodes connected to the network, that is, V (network value) = 2 ^N (number of network nodes). The user growth trend of social networks such as Facebook and WeChat is typical.
This hits the question that Wan Min has been thinking about vaguely. Since 2014, when it is mainly used as a mutual gold B2C signing tool, the model of Shangshang signing and the entire industry has grown linearly, one customer is called one customer: “It doesn’t mean that if I call one customer, I can attract other customers. Come in.”
At this time, Wan Min realized that in fact, electronic signatures can have network effects. The key is to shift the focus from the B2C contract scenario to the B2B (enterprise-to-enterprise) scenario, from being a tool to being a platform.
To make a tool is to serve someone else’s network. Taking Lianjia signed by Shangshang as an example, when its users sign online renting and buying contracts, they log in to Lianjia account. The electronic signing company only provides single-point technology and does not master the account system.
To do a platform is to build your own network. Different from the B2C scenario in which a large number of contracts are sent to individuals in one direction, B2B contract signing is a two-way intercommunication process with back-and-forth. When a department or an enterprise uses an electronic signature platform, it will drive multiple internal departments and multiple upstream and downstream cooperative enterprises to use the platform and enter the same network. The more companies in the network, the easier it is to issue contracts to each other. The platform can deposit customer accounts.
“After doing it for a few years, I found out that we are lucky, this track is so good.” Wan Min said that she realized that in addition to pure hard work, you can also be clever.
After this class, Shangshang signed a technical team of less than 10 people, secretly researched and developed for half a year in the small black room, and launched a new product of the signing management platform in early 2018.
The new offering is still a standardized SaaS offering in the cloud.
Wan Min now has a new understanding of insisting on standardization: contract management is something that allows enterprises to communicate with each other, just like railways, highways, and E-mail systems, which should be standardized themselves, “otherwise, the contracts sent by enterprises to each other, It can’t even be viewed and signed,” Wan Min said.
It is deployed in the cloud, that is, on the Internet, because it can complete the whole process of data production, processing and transmission on a unified platform, which can better ensure the data security of all parties to the contract. If the locally deployed system is used, when companies want to issue contracts to each other, although the data transmission is in the cloud, the production and processing are still local, which means that each company signing the contract should back up its own company information and seal information to the other party. In the system, there are hidden dangers of printing security. When an enterprise wants to sign a contract with multiple enterprises, it needs to have an account in the system of multiple contract objects, which requires repeated registration, and the process is more complicated.
But the new product is no longer a lightweight product, which is very different from the design idea of B2C contracting tools.
In the B2C scenario, contracts of the same template are repeatedly and massively issued to individuals, and the rights management and process are relatively simple. However, in a large company, careful authority distinction and information isolation should be done. This includes specifying which seals are managed by the parent company and which are owned by the subsidiary; the types of contract templates available to the subsidiary, the specific fields that can be changed, etc. Similarly, within the same company, personnel contracts involving sensitive information such as wages cannot be viewed by other departments.
New products also need to consider multi-person and multi-department cooperation. For example, to initiate a procurement contract, it has to go through multiple links such as drafting, legal review, financial review, and supplier qualification certification.
In terms of external communication, for enterprises that have been deposited in the contract management platform, the contract recipients can be automatically updated on the platform. Even if Party B takes over the replacement of personnel, Party A who issued the contract does not need to re-enter it, because the platform knows who the specific handler of Party B is.
When it comes to the signing of three-party contracts, such as when a manpower outsourcing company regularly recruits personnel for customers, the new product has a “seal authorization” function, which allows you to set which seal to authorize, how long it will be authorized, and which contracts it will be used for. If it is an offline process, the manpower outsourcing company needs to go to the customer to stamp it regularly, and it has to be able to use the stamp at the right time.
In line with new products, Shangshangsign adjusted its sales strategy: 4 salespeople were left to continue to serve the top 200 mutual gold companies, and the remaining 60 salespeople turned to push new products to companies in traditional industries, such as manufacturing, retail, finance, etc. .
This has allowed Shangshang to accidentally escape industry fluctuations. With the thunderstorm incident and stricter supervision, mutual gold companies closed down intensively after June 2018, and there were more than 1,000 left by the end of the year, which was halved compared to the previous year. The new products signed by Shangshang won 91 major customers of traditional enterprises that year, and the company’s revenue in the second half of 2018 was even higher than that in the first half.
After continuing to run in the new direction for a year, in early 2020, Wan Min found that the sales transformation was still not thorough enough. The sales team’s execution of winning node-type large customers is not in place. Node-type large customers refer to enterprises that have contracts with a large number of enterprises and can attract more companies to “network”. A typical example is the Global 500.
These customers are strategic to the company but not cost-effective for salespeople. It took 11 months for Shangshang to talk about Starbucks. In the same amount of time, a sales with outstanding performance can make more than a dozen medium-sized customers, and Starbucks will not bring 10 times the income of medium-sized customers. After 2018, the company has higher incentives for major customers to complete orders, but it is still difficult to change the team’s inertia.
Wan Min made a decision: It is mandatory that the sales elites who contribute 75% of the income and 20% of the employees to Shanghai and Shanghai are specializing in the Fortune Global 500, and can no longer be small and medium-sized customers.
She knows that this means that the company’s revenue growth will slow down that year, and customer acquisition costs will increase. The strategic salesperson who specializes in leading customers sent an email to Wan Min to protest, “What’s wrong with being more customers? Only for us as a top 500 customer, it’s too few.” Twenty strategic salespeople lost half of them that year. . For Shanghai Signing, which is still losing money, the slowdown in revenue growth caused by only making nodes also means financing pressure.
“If you let it go and hit medium-sized customers, the speed of networking will be slow. You must choose between networking speed and income, and I will definitely choose networking.” Wan Min said, 2020 is the most stressful and difficult time to choose. But she thought she had made the right choice. In the same year, 55 major strategic customers were obtained.
After determining the strict implementation of the key account strategy, the method of signing on the platform is to first thoroughly understand an industry, connect the upstream and downstream, and then connect multiple industries to form a network. Taking the automobile industry as an example, after Shangshang signed into the OEM, the sales have entered the upstream and downstream companies such as power batteries, car dealers, travel, parts, auto finance, and auto services. At present, Shanghai Sign has entered 11 industries such as automobile, banking, manufacturing, logistics, home appliances, chain retail, and fast-moving consumer goods. Last year, the number of enterprise users of new products reached 310,000.
ORIX Financial Leasing (China) Co., Ltd., as a professional financial leasing subsidiary of Japan’s ORIX Group in China, introduced Shanghai and Shanghai under the 2020 digital transformation strategic plan, first testing the waters in the vehicle leasing business, and then in the small direct business. The expansion of the leasing business field has improved the contracting efficiency between ORIX and upstream and downstream companies, and has also driven many ORIX leasing business customers and upstream and downstream companies to register and sign up.
When Daikin Industries of Japan became a customer of Shanghai Signing in 2020, the person in charge of the other party told Wan Min that when they inspected Shanghai Signing, they found that dozens of dealers had already signed up for use, so that they did not need to teach dealers to use the system. , the promotion is more convenient. These dealers also serve Haier and Hisense. The two companies started using the shanghai in 2019. Haier currently has more than 20,000 cooperative companies signing up for use.
Mondelez International, which owns well-known snack brands such as Oreo and Quduoduo, had already used about 25% of its cooperating distributors before the introduction of Shanghai Sign. dealer.
Wan Min said that when he goes out to talk about customers, the sales will directly put the contract network diagram connected with the customer’s logo: “These companies in this industry are all using our products, do you want to do business with him?”
Wan Min believes that the essence of e-signature as a network effect is not a technical barrier, but a comprehensive difference in product design and sales strategy caused by cognition. Therefore, in the early stage of network establishment, she was reluctant to explain the strategy too much. But now, she believes that Shanghai Signing has initially formed a network prototype.
An important metric for SaaS is the renewal rate, which measures the change in the total amount of lease renewals for all existing customers. In 2021, the renewal rate of Shangshang Signing contract management platform products will be 105%. Since the launch of this new product in 2018, the annual renewal rate has exceeded 100%.
Shangshang also pays attention to a special indicator: the mutual signing rate. Mutual signing refers to the spontaneous signing of a contract between two paying companies that have signed up on the Shanghai Signing Network. The mutual signing rate refers to the ratio of the number of companies that have signed each other to the total number of paying companies on the Shanghai Signing Platform. Wan Min believes that mutual signing is a signal of mutual exchange. In 2021, the mutual signing rate of the Shanghai Signing Contract Management Platform is 42%.
Learn to be a CEO
Wan Min is not a serial entrepreneur, nor does he have many years of experience in the corporate service industry. She is learning to be a CEO. In addition to strategy and product direction, an important homework is people and organizations.
From 2018 to 2019, the former co-founder Lin Xianfeng and the former CTO Tao Zhen left the company. The personnel turmoil at the top of the entrepreneurial team is often an unfavorable factor affecting the development of the company.
Lin Xianfeng is a member of the founding team of Shangshangsi. He served as the CTO when the company was first established. In 2016, he began to manage the customer success team and customer service team as the CSO (Chief Service Officer). When he left, he served as a senior expert in the product market. He sued Shangshang to terminate the labor contract in violation of regulations and demanded compensation for three times the wages.
Tao Zhen was invited by Wan Min to join Shanghai Signing in 2018. He previously worked for Intuit and Paycor, an American SaaS company. After resigning in 2019, he sued Shanghai Signing for not redeeming the option as agreed. The court decided that Shanghai Signing should pay 5.82 million in the first instance. yuan repurchase option.
When dealing with Lin Xianfeng’s relationship, Wan Min felt that she was not decisive enough. In the 8th month of the company’s establishment, she realized that the other party could not keep up with the rhythm, but it took more than two years before she started to adjust the other party’s position and role in the company. Job change is one of the reasons for Lin Xianfeng’s dissatisfaction.
Wan Min’s review of Tao Zhen’s resignation is that he did not comprehensively and deeply examine the other party’s specific work experience in the United States. One year after Tao Zhen joined the company, Wan Min found that the other party’s ability did not meet the company’s needs. “This is a big failure for me to know people and employ people.” Wan Min said. This time, she made a quicker decision. It was 2 months from when Wan Min realized the problem to when Tao Zhen left. The current executive team of Shangshang sign has absorbed the former senior vice president of UFIDA, the former founder of a SaaS company, and the senior managers of Salesforce, Tencent, and SAP.
Xiong Fei commented that Wan Min’s strengths and weaknesses are the same. She is very persistent. The advantage is that she is sure of the strategic direction. She has been working in SaaS for 8 years. Even if she faces income pressure and changes in investment preferences, she will not be moved; The relationship has grayscale, the goal can be direct, but the means sometimes have to be soft. “She is much better than five years ago, but she is still a very rigid person.” Xiong Fei said.
She is stubborn and unwilling to compromise on some principles that Wan Min has identified.
Shangshang signed in early 2018 rejected Ali’s investment invitation and Dingding’s in-depth cooperation proposal. Wan Min believes that although it is easier to survive in cooperation with Internet giants, it will lose the “neutrality” that major customers are especially interested in. They prefer that there are no giants with competing businesses behind the electronic signing platform. Take bank customers as an example, they do not want the e-signature platform they use to have investment from Alibaba or Tencent, both of which have internet banking business.
The other two leading companies in China’s e-signature market, e-signature and Fada, have chosen to cooperate deeply with technology giants. Ant Financial owns more than 20% of the shares in e-signature and is its largest shareholder; Tencent led the C and D rounds of Fada. The main investors in the sign are Jingwei, Wuyuan, DCM, Shunwei, Tiger and other financial institutions.
Another principle of Shanghai Signing is that sales staff are strictly prohibited from giving rebates to customers’ purchasing staff. This sounds like a rule that everyone should abide by. In fact, to B companies that dare to publicly declare that they will not give rebates are a minority.
Wan Min believes that this is a difficult approach at the beginning, but it is profitable to persevere. After the reputation of not giving rebates is formed, customer purchasers will be more daring to recommend the products signed on to the boss, and there will be no psychological burden of being suspected of taking benefits. Eliminating rebates can also reduce the legal risk of signing up. Electronic signature is an industry related to contracts. Wanmin hopes to form a corporate culture of integrity. Customers choose to sign on the basis of trust in products and services, not short-term interest binding.
There may be very few Chinese CEOs like Wan Min who write 10,000-character long texts on their personal accounts to analyze the data moisture of competitors. Many people questioned her motives for writing the article. In China’s business culture, it is not a virtue to publicly accuse an opponent. But she said that she doesn’t care about following the common founder’s standard answer: “I respect my opponent very much, and I am grateful for the common education market.” Since it is fake, it should not be respected.
There was once an Internet technology giant when it provided cloud services to Shangshang, and there was a bug in the system and the price was low, but the company did not inform Shangshang of the mistake, but secretly increased the price, and contacted Shangshang to be directly responsible. The personnel of the cloud service help to conceal. Wan Min was very angry after finding out that the employee was bribed, and Shangshang signed up to change the cloud service provider. Currently, the data is being gradually migrated.
In the office building in Hangzhou, the elevator is slow and there are many passengers during the morning rush hour. When waiting for the elevator on the first floor, there is often no space after the elevator opens. This is because many people will run to the second floor first, and squeeze in to occupy a seat when they descend the empty elevator on the previous trip, which makes it difficult for people who normally queue on the first floor to get on the elevator.
The fundamental reason for the lack of a location for the elevator is insufficient resources. In this case, some people find shortcuts, do not follow the rules, and some people continue to queue up honestly.
Wan Min is the third kind of person. Once, when the elevator door opened on the first floor, she said to an elevator person who had already occupied a seat: “You are using bad money to drive out good money.” The down elevator does not open the door on the second floor. The entire second floor is the team that signed up on the board. Everyone goes downstairs and takes the stairs.
This article is reprinted from: https://www.latepost.com/news/dj_detail?id=1110
This site is for inclusion only, and the copyright belongs to the original author.